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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
The world of local government is a place of remarkable occurrences:
At the meeting of the governing authority, the chambers were overflowing, passions were palpable, and the media descended in droves. The
vote was taken on the re-zoning petition. The council's vote was evenly
split. The newly elected Mayor would have to break the tie. He
announced to all that he did not know how he should vote. He then
proceeded to toss a coin into the air, explaining that if it was "heads,"
he would vote "yes," and if it was "tails," he would vote "no." As if in
slow motion, the coin descended-and the Mayor voted "yes."!1
The law applicable to local governments, both decisional and statutory,
is no less remarkable.2

I. MUNICIPALITIES
A.

Annexation
The Georgia General Assembly provides two basic methods of
municipal annexation: (a) by enacting individual local statutes; and (b)
by authorizing municipalities themselves to effect the procedure.' The

* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.

Deep appreciation is expressed to the Carl Vinson Institute of Government of the
University of Georgia for summer research support which contributed most significantly
to the preparation of this survey.
1. An account from R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: LrrE 41 (1997).
2. For a general "profile" of Georgia local government law, those who practice it and the
practice itself, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND THE PRACTICE OF
GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1996), a volume jointly published by the Georgia
Municipal Association and the Association County Commissioners of Georgia, Atlanta.
3. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Law of Municipal Annexation in Georgia:
Euolution of a Concept?, 2 GA. L. REV. 35 (1967); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal
Annexation in Georgia: Nay-Sayers Beware, 5 GA. L. REV. 499 (1971).
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latter method includes three systems,4 each of which expressly limits
the municipal annexation power to "contiguous" territory" Whether
annexation by local statute is likewise limited was, prior to this survey
period, an unresolved issue.'
The Georgia Supreme Court finally provided the answer in City ofFort
Oglethorpe v. Boger,7 a challenge to a local statute annexing land "not
adjacent or contiguous to an existing municipal boundary."s Reversing
the trial judge, the supreme court declared the legislature's annexation
power both "plenary," and "limited only by the federal and state
constitutions. Accordingly, the court held the non-contiguous property
validly within the municipality.1

4. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-1 to -22 ("100% method"); O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-30 to -40 ("60%

method"); O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-50 to -61 (1993 &Supp. 1997) ("resolution of intent" method).
5. See discussion in R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Annexation in Georgia: The
Contiguity Conundrum, 9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974).
6. "Whether or not, therefore, the General Assembly considers itself limited by the
requirement of contiguity when it adopts local annexation statutes, it has expressly
imposed the requirement in all three of its general delegations of the annexation power to
municipalities." R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalAnnexation in Georgia: The Contiguity
Conundrum, 9 GA. L. REv. 167, 178 (1974).
7. 267 Ga. 485, 480 S.E.2d 186 (1997).
8. Id. at 485, 480 S.E.2d at 186. Plaintiffs' primary objections were to a later
annexation by the municipality of lands contiguous to lands annexed by local statute some
eleven years earlier. The earlier annexed lands were admittedly non-contiguous to the
municipality. "Thus, even though this dispute focuses on the property annexed by the City,
the question for decision is whether the General Assembly's annexation was valid." Id.,
480 S.E.2d at 187.
9. Id. at 486, 480 S.E.2d at 187. "Although contiguity is a requirement for annexation
by a municipality, there is no such requirement for annexation by the General Assembly."
Id.
10. Id. An indication that the General Assembly had considered contiguity a limitation
upon its annexation power was its statement in the "60%method" statute as follows: "This
article is not intended to affect or restrict the present authority of the General Assembly
to legislate regarding the annexation of any area contiguousto any municipal corporation
in this state." O.C.G.A. § 36-36-50 (1991) (emphasis added). The court's majority opinion
rejected that argument as follows:
The plain meaning of that code section is that the General Assembly is not
precluded from annexing contiguous property simply because it granted to
municipalities the authority to do that. That code section cannot be construed to
limit the power of the legislature to annex property which is not contiguous to a
municipality.
267 Ga. at 486, 480 S.E.2d at 187. In a dissenting opinion (concurred in by Justice
Hunstein), Justice Carley maintained that the above code section "should be construed as
a general law limiting the General Assembly to annexation of contiguous areas into
municipalities by local laws." Id. at 488, 480 S.E.2d at 188 (Carley, J., dissenting).
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B. Officers and Employees
Litigation of the survey period focused upon municipal officers and
employees from a number of intriguing perspectives. Few perspectives
are more intriguing than the historic writ of quo warranto," the action
featured in Hornsby v. Campbell. 2 The contest turned upon whether
the appointment-retention office of city solicitor's constituted an
"elective" position which the holder automatically vacated upon
qualifying as a candidate for county district attorney 4 Although
retention elections subject the incumbent only to a yes-or-no popular
vote, the supreme court declared the solicitor a "municipal elected
official" subject to the vacation prescription.'"
Equally extraordinary, the writ of mandamus constituted the
disgruntled employee's remedy of choice in Byrd v. City of Atlanta."
That employee, whose dismissal had been modified to suspension, sought
an order for the award of back pay. 7 On grounds that petitioner could
have challenged the board's omission of back pay by writ of certiorari,

11. For perspective upon this historic writ and its concrete context in Georgia local
government, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE WRIT OF Quo WARRANTO IN GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW (1986).
12. 267 Ga. 511, 480 S.E.2d 189 (1997).
13. Id. at 512, 480 S.E.2d at 190. The mayor selected the solicitor from a slate of
candidates recommended by a panel of superior court judges. The solicitor then served an
initial term followed by a yes-no city wide retention vote in a special election which did not
involve a challenge by another candidate. Id.
14. Id. The municipal mayor sought quo warranto to vacate the solicitor's office upon
the incumbent's qualifying as a candidate for the office of county district attorney. The
mayor maintained that the qualification triggered the provision of the Georgia Constitution
(art. II, § JI, para. V) requiring that the office of any "municipal elected official" be declared
vacant upon that official qualifying "for another city, county or municipal elective office."
The solicitor argued that her retention election position was not a "municipal elected
official" within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Id.
15. Id. at 514, 480 S.E.2d at 191-92. The court reasoned that because the solicitor
"could not serve without impunity and was subject to a vote in an open election," she was
a "municipal elected official" who vacated the office when qualifying for another. Id.
Accordingly, the court sustained the trial judge's issuance of the writ of quo warranto. Id.
16. 266 Ga. 800, 471 S.E.2d 852 (1996). For the history and applicability of the writ
of mandamus in the concrete context of local government, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1989). As its title would
indicate, the monograph emphasizes the inordinately inappropriate and excessive appeal
to the writ as a means of righting perceived wrongs in the local government context.
17. 266 Ga, at 801, 471 S.E.2d at 853. The municipal police department had fired the
employee, the civil service board had modified the dismissal to a thirty-day suspension, and
the employee had failed to appeal the board's failure to award back pay. Id.
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"an adequate legal remedy,"' the supreme court held mandamus
unavailable. 9
To complete the high intrigue cycle, City of Buchanan u. Pope2"
encompassed an official's plea of municipal estoppel.2 There the court
of appeals was able to reconcile the municipal "refusal to reappoint" its
long-time police chief with the municipal police manual's protection
against "dismissal."2 The former power derived from the municipal
charter so that even in the event of conflict it would prevail over the
provisions of the manual. 2' To the former chief's argument that the
city had previously failed to abide by its charter, the court declared any
such failures "ultra vires."24 "[Tihere can be no [municipal] estoppel,"
the court explained to the chief, "where the act is ultra vires." 5
Yet another police officer's dismissal yielded the contest in City of
Atlanta v. Houston.' The case climaxed the trial judge's efforts to
clarify the municipal civil service board's actions in overturning the
dismissal and ordering a suspension. 7 Specifically, the judge ordered
18. Id. at 800, 471 S.E.2d at 853.
19. Id. at 801, 471 S.E.2d at 853. The court thus affirmed dismissal of petitioner's
request: "The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only when
the petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought and there is no other adequate
legal remedy." Id.
20. 222 Ga. App. 716, 476 S.E.2d 53 (1996).
21. Id. at 716, 476 S.E.2d at 53. For perspective upon, and extensive analysis of, the
doctrine of estoppel, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAw OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAw (1984).
22. 222 Ga. App. at 721, 476 S.E.2d at 58.
In summary, if the "discipline" provisions of the City ... police department
manual are interpreted as a disciplinary scheme rather than as a merit system or
a grant of permanent tenure, then they do not conflict with the City's charter
setting a maximum term of office for the City's police chief.
Id. The court effected this harmonizing construction under the interpretative precept of
in pari materia. Id. at 717, 476 S.E.2d at 55. For extensive treatment of that precept,
confined peculiarly to Georgia law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STATUTORY CoNsTRUCTION
IN GEORGA: THE DOCTRiNE OF IN PARi MATERA (1996).
23. 222 Ga. App. at 721, 476 S.E.2d at 58. 'The interpretation advocated by (the
Chief], however, directly conflicts with [section] 16 of the charter, and the charter must
prevail over that interpretation." Id.
24. Id. at 720, 476 S.E.2d at 57. "Any earlier failure or refusal of the City to obey the
terms of its charter was ultra vires." Id.
25. Id. "While a municipal corporation may be estopped where the act relied on,
though irregular, was within its charter powers, there can be no estoppel where the act is
ultra vires." Id. The court reversed the trial judge's refusal to grant the municipality's
motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Id. at 722, 476 S.E.2d at 58.
26. 221 Ga. App. 61, 471 S.E.2d 12 (1996).
27. Id. at 61, 471 S.E.2d at 12. The police officer's dismissal had occurred in 1991, the
civil service board had overturned the dismissal and ordered suspension in 1992, the
municipality appealed to the superior court, and, in 1993, the court began its efforts to
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members of the 1992 board to reconvene in 1995 and explain their
decisions.' Reversing that order, the court expressly concurred with
the city's position that "the superior court erred as a matter of law by
ordering the reconstitution of the former Board thereby impermissibly
bestowing upon ordinary citizens authority that could only be granted
to them by the charter, code of ordinances, and mayoral appointment.n29

Few aspects of municipal employment attract more litigation than
workers' compensation.' In Autry v. Mayor of Savannah,"'the court
of appeals reviewed an assessment of attorney fees for the municipality's
refusal to pay for an injured employee's physical therapy. 2 Emphasizing the standard as one of "reasonable grounds," the court noted
evidence that the prescribed therapy was unlikely to effect a cure or give
relief.' Accordingly, "the finding of the board that the City's defense
was made without reasonable grounds is without evidence to support it."5

have the board clarify aspects of its decision. The board members' terms expired in 1994,
with a new mayor and board taking office. Id. at 61-62, 471 S.E.2d at 12-13.
28. Id. at 62-63, 471 S.E.2d at 13. The court concluded that the new board had no
authority over the case and sought to confer all authority upon the former members. Id.
29. Id. at 63, 471 S.E.2d at 13. "Thus, we find that the court abused its discretion in
ordering the former Board members to reconvene to clarify their initial decision." I& at
64, 471 S.E.2d at 14.
30. For background and analysis, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Workers' Compensation in
GeorgiaMunicipal Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 57 (1980).
31. 222 Ga. App. 691, 475 S.E.2d 702 (1996).
32. Id. at 691,475 S.E.2d at 702. The Administrative Law Judge had awarded benefits
and attorney fees, the Board of Workers' Compensation had affirmed, the trial court had
reversed the assessment of attorney fees, and the claimant had appealed the reversal. Id.
33. Id. at 692, 475 S.E.2d at 703. "While the question of whether there are reasonable
grounds for resisting an award of compensation is an issue of fact to be determined by the
board, attorney fees may not be awarded where the matter is closely contested on
reasonable grounds." Id.
34. Id. at 693, 475 S.E.2d at 703.
Given the evidence that [claimant's] subjective manifestations of pain failed to
correspond with objective medical findings, [claimant's] failure to improve after an
earlier cycle of physical therapy, and [the doctor's] contemporaneous notes
indicating that the May-June treatments were likewise ineffective, it cannot be
said that the prescribed therapy was likely to effect a cure or give relief.
35. Id., 475 S.E.2d at 704. An additional contest of the period involved workers'
compensation but not a municipal employee. Rather, City of Dalton u. Gene Rogers
Construction Co., 223 Ga. App. 819, 479 S.E.2d 171 (1996), featured a municipal effort to
obtain indemnification from the employer whose employee was electrocuted from contact
with a municipal power line. Id. at 819-20,479 S.E.2d at 171-73. Rejecting that effort, the
court held that the High Voltage Safety Act (O.C.G.A. § 46-3-33 (1992)) did not create an
exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (O.C.G.A.
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C. Elections
The process of filling the office of municipal council gave rise to two
contests during the period under scrutiny. In Maye v. Pundt," the
attack went to ballot preparation. 7 In response, the supreme court
held that the challenger possessed no statutory right to have his
nickname placed on the ballot." Such matters, the court asserted, "are
best left to the discretion of the General Assembly." 9 Additionally, the
court refused to void the election for the superintendent's failure to
prepare a sample ballot.' That "irregularity," the court held, was
insufficient "to change or place in doubt the result of the election." 1
The second contest, City of East Point v. League of Women Voters,4
featured disagreement over filling a council vacancy. Under the
municipal charter, the term of the office was four years and, if the
vacancy occurred during the last two years, it was to be filled by
appointment." The court held that later general statutes had changed
the office term to five years, with the result that more than two years
remained in the term at the time of the vacancy's occurrence."

§ 34-9-11 (1992)). 223 Ga. App. at 822, 479 S.E.2d at 174. Thus, the court concluded, "the
employee may not sue the employer in tort, and the employer may not be impleaded as a
joint tortfeasor in an employee's action against a third party." Id. at 819-20, 479 S.E.2d
at 171, 173. Presiding Judge Pope and Presiding Judge McMurray dissented.
36. 267 Ga. 243, 477 S.E.2d 119 (1996).
37. Id. at 243, 477 S.E.2d at 120.
38. Id. at 246, 477 S.E.2d at 121. The court reasoned that "failure to place [challenger's] nickname on the ballot cannot be considered an act of misconduct within the meaning
of OCGA [section] 21-3-422(1)." Id.
39. Id. Even assuming otherwise, the court observed, challenger had failed to show
that the omission had placed the election result in doubt. Id.
40. Id., 477 S.E.2d at 122. See O.C.G.A. § 21-3-194(b) (1993).
41. 267 Ga. at 246, 477 S.E.2d at 122. The statute authorizing election challenges
(O.C.G.A. § 21-3-422(1) (1993)) requires that challenger show "misconduct, fraud, or
irregularity by any primary or election official or officials sufficient to change or place in
doubt the result."
42. 267 Ga. 112, 475 S.E.2d 598 (1996).
43. Id. at 113, 475 S.E.2d at 598. Here the council member had been elected in 1992
and then resigned in 1995, with only one year remaining in the term. The council filled
the vacancy by appointment as authorized by the charter for vacancies occurring with less
than two years remaining in the term. Plaintiffs in the case sought to mandamus a special
election for filling the vacancy. Id.
44. Id. at 114, 475 S.E.2d at 600. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. section 21-3-60(aX4)
(1993) which expressly provided that "municipal officers elected in 1992 shall have their
terms expire December 31, 1997." The court reasoned that "as the latest expression of the
General Assembly on the length of the term of office of a municipal officer elected in 1992,
the statute takes precedence over the city charter's provision for a four-year term of office
for a municipal officer elected in 1992." 267 Ga. at 114, 475 S.E.2d at 600.
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Accordingly,
the charter required a special election for the unexpired
45
term.

D. Regulation
The municipality must ever be mindful of the illusive line between
regulation and taxation, and of the general prohibition against employing the latter to accomplish the former.' That prohibition operated in
Sexton v. City of Jonesboro47 to invalidate a municipal "occupation tax"
on practicing law.4' As structured, the measure required registration
and fee payment at the beginning of each year, thus operating as a
"precondition on the practice of law. 9 Additionally, the measure
imposed punishment not upon delinquency of payment, but upon the
Both those features
delinquent's attempt to conduct business.'
convinced the supreme court that the "tax ordinance" operated "effectively as a precondition or license for engaging in the practice of law,
rendering it a regulatory fee."5 '

45. 267 Ga. at 114, 475 S.E.2d at 600. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
issuance of a mandamus ordering that a special municipal election be conducted to fill the
council vacancy. Id.
Dealing with recall rather than election, Davis v. Shavers, 225 Ga. App. 497, 484 S.E.2d
243 (1997), focused upon a libel action against members of a political group which filed
unsuccessful recall applications against a municipal official. Holding allegations contained
in recall applications only conditionally (rather than absolutely) privileged, the court
reasoned that the recall statute "affords an elected official no opportunity to contest false
and malicious accusations in a judicial forum prior to a recall election, and we will not take
away the official's only right to seek recourse against false and malicious accusations
subsequent to a recall effort." Id. at 500, 484 S.E.2d at 247. For treatments of beth recall
and defamation in the setting of local government, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Remembering
Recall in Local Government Law, 10 GA. L. REV. 883 (1976); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Defamationin GeorgiaLocal Government Law: A BriefHistory, 16 GA. L. REV. 627 (1982).
46. Both the line and the prohibition are among the facets treated in R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Discretionin Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 651 (1974).
47. 267 Ga. 571, 481 S.E.2d 818 (1997).
48. Id. at 571, 481 S.E.2d at 819. The ordinance purported to levy the tax and to
require professionals to pay either a flat fee or a fee determined by gross receipts, with
payment option to be exercised on January 1 of each year. Punishment was by fine or
imprisonment for transacting business without a tax certificate and while delinquent. The
challengers were attorneys engaged in the practice of law within the municipality. I&.
49. Id. at 572, 481 S.E.2d at 820.
50. Id. at 573, 481 S.E.2d at 821. "This supports the conclusion that the ordinances
aim and effect is to regulate the practice of law] rather than to simply gain revenue." Id.
51. Id. at 572-73, 481 S.E.2d at 820. "Examination of the ordinance compels the
conclusion that regardless of its stated purpose, it operates pragmatically as more than a
measure to generate revenue." Id.
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Frequently, regulatory litigation pivots on procedural points. In
Soerries v. City of Columbus,52 the court of appeals rejected a challenge
to the municipal revocation of an alcoholic beverage license." Reviewing the challenger's attacks upon both ordinance and proceedings, the
court emphasized that plaintiff's "exclusive mechanism [for challenging]
the Council's revocation of his liquor license was by filing a petition for
certiorari."' In contrast, in City of Albany v. Oxford Solid Waste
Landfill, Inc.,' the supreme court rejected the procedural argument."6
There the court approved a mandamus ordering issuance of a land
disturbance permit."7 Refuting the municipal contention that an
adequate legal remedy existed, the court deemed it "obvious that
[requiring plaintiff] to pursue an administrative appeal before the City's
Planning Commission would be a futile act."'
Substantively, municipal regulation continued its focus of recent years
upon adult entertainment establishments.59 Secret Desires Lingerie,
Inc. v. City of Atlanta' featured an ordinance purporting to regulate
52. 222 Ga. App. 745, 476 S.E.2d 64 (1996).
53. Id. at 745, 476 S.E.2d at 64. The council had provided notice and hearing and
predicated revocation on evidence of multiple calls for law enforcement personnel at the
challenger's club. Id.
54. Id. at 746, 476 S.E.2d at 66. The court reasoned that the revocation constituted the
exercise of judicial power and that O.C.G.A. section 5-4-1 "provides that such judicial
decisions are reviewable in superior courts by way of certiorari." Id.
55. 267 Ga. 283, 476 S.E.2d 729 (1996).
56. Id. at 283, 476 S.E.2d at 729.
57. Id. at 284, 476 S.E.2d at 730-31. Plaintiff sought the permit for operation of a
landfill, and the court held that the municipality's own zoning ordinance "recognizes that
land may be used for landfill purposes, so long as the proper procedures are followed and
the requisite approvals are obtained." Id.
58. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 730. The court relied upon evidence that the city engineer had
rejected application for the permit because he was so instructed by the city manager at the
direction of the city commission. Id. "Accordingly, there was no error in the issuance of
the writ, despite an available avenue of administrative appeal." Id.
In yet another case of the period, CheshireBridgeEnters., Inc. v. State, 221 Ga. App. 426,
472 S.E.2d 6 (1996), the court of appeals held that general statutes (O.C.GA. section 3-320(a)) prohibiting liquor sales on Sunday are applicable to private clubs, and that any
municipal code exceptions to the prohibition would be invalid. Id. at 427, 472 S.E.2d at 7.
59. For the previous year's focus upon such establishments, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Local Government Law, 48 MERCER L. REV. 421, 428 (1996). For the treatment of the
substantive municipal regulatory power in an assortment of contexts, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr.,Reasoningby Riddle: The Power to Prohibitin GeorgiaLocal Government Law,
9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor
Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REv. 1039 (1981); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
'AscertainableStandards"v. "UnbridledDiscretion' in Local Government Regulation, GA.
COUNTY GoV. MAG. (Dec. 1989).
60. 266 Ga. 760, 470 S.E.2d 879 (1996).
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lingerie modeling studios."1 Assuming the ordinance's impetus to be
pernicious secondary effects of such studios, the supreme court sought
municipal evidence of those effects.6 2 That search, the court announced, was in vain: "The City is unable to point to any evidence...
that it considered specific studies of the pernicious secondary effects of
lingerie modeling studios before enacting the ordinance.' Accordingly,
the court declared the measure unconstitutional."
The municipality enjoyed more success in Goldrush H v. City of
Marietta,s6 defending its 1995 ordinance prohibiting any one establishment from obtaining both a liquor license and an adult entertainment
license." Establishments previously possessing both licenses presented
the court with broad constitutional challenges. In an extensive opinion,
the Chief Justice first declared free from federal infirmity Georgia's 1994
amendment to its constitution expressly delegating expansive regulatory
6 7 Then focusing
authority over alcohol and nudity.
upon the ordinance
6
itself," the court reviewed preamble statements, 69 meeting tran-

61. Id at 760, 470 S.E.2d at 879.
62. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 880. "When a governing body enacts an ordinance regulating
adult entertainment establishments because of their purported undesirable secondary
effects, it must rely upon specific evidence showing a correlation between such establishments and the undesirable secondary effects the governing body seeks to control." Id. at
760-61, 470 S.E.2d at 880.
63. Id. at 761, 470 S.E.2d at 880 (emphasis added). The court said that at trial the city
introduced testimony of three vice squad officers that there was a correlation between
lingerie studios and prostitution, but "[t]here is not a scintilla of evidence demonstrating
that the police officers (or their superiors) alerted the city council to the problems they
uncovered." Id.
64. Id. Presiding Justice Fletcher, joined by Justice Hunstein, dissented, on grounds
that the trial judge found municipal knowledge of secondary effects at the time of the
ordinance's enactment. That finding, Justice Fletcher maintained, was not clearly
erroneous and the ordinance did not violate free speech. 266 Ga. at 762, 470 S.E.2d at 880
(Fletcher, J., dissenting).
65. 267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997).
66. Id. at 683, 482 S.E.2d at 347. "In effect, the amended adult entertainment
ordinance banned alcohol in adult entertainment establishments by requiring an applicant
to choose between obtaining a liquor license or obtaining a license to provide adult
entertainment." Id., 482 S.E.2d at 350.
67. I& at 685, 482 S.E.2d at 352 (citing GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. VII). Rejecting
the challenge of overbroadness, the court reasoned that the amendment was not selfexecuting, and that "while the wording of the constitutional amendment authorizes
enactment of local legislation that would be condemned as overbroad, it is the language of
the enacted local legislation, not the constitutional amendment, which must be examined
for overbreadth." Id.
68. 267 Ga. at 687, 482 S.E.2d at 353. The court held that the ordinance must be
analyzed under the tests of the First Amendment, not the Twenty-First Amendment nor
the 1994 amendment to the Georgia Constitution. Id.
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scripts,7" and executed affidavits.71 The court deemed this evidence
sufficient to confirm the city's "predominate goal of combatting pernicious secondary effects,"72 and to establish the ordinance as "contentneutral.7' Proceeding to its familiar "tripartite test" for restrictions
upon expression,7 4 the court held the ordinance to "pass constitutional
muster" as "a proper exercise of the city's police power."75 Finally, the
court considered previous license holders' claims to vested property
rights. Although challengers held vested rights in licenses annually
issued them," the court delineated, they possessed no "legitimate claim
of entitlement to continued reissuance of their annual licenses,"77 and
thus no "protectable property interest in their renewal. 7'

69. Id at 690, 482 S.E.2d at 355. The preamble stated that the ordinance was based
on the experiences of other local governments, police reports ofcriminal activity around the
establishments, and a finding of accelerated community blight around such establishments.
Id
70. Id. at 691, 482 S.E.2d at 356. Transcripts of the meeting at which the ordinance
was enacted evidenced that the council considered studies from other communities showing
a correlation between the increase in crime and the presence of adult entertainment, and
citizen concern over property values. Id
71. I& Affidavits executed by each member of the council, following the filing of the
lawsuit, averred reliance upon studies from other cities and that the studies were relevant
to problems faced by their municipality. Id.
72. Id. at 692, 482 S.E.2d at 356.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court draws this test from ParamountPictures Corp. v. Busbee, 250 Ga.
252, 297 S.E.2d 250 (1982): "(1) Does the ordinance further an important governmental
interest? (2) Is that interest unrelated to the suppression of speech? and (3) Is the
legislation an incidental restriction of speech no greater than essential to further the
important governmental interest?" 267 Ga. at 692, 482 S.E.2d at 356. Here the court held
the municipality to have a substantial interest in preserving the quality of urban life, that
the city's goals were important interests unrelated to suppressing speech, and the
ordinance was sufficiently "narrowly tailored" because it exempted "mainstream
performance houses, museums, or theaters." Id. at 693, 482 S.E.2d at 357.
75. 267 Ga. at 693, 482 S.E.2d at 357.
76. Id. at 695, 482 S.E.2d at 359. "Since [the] city code sets forth the criteria which,
if met, results in the issuance of a license, and specifies that a liquor license issued by the
city can be suspended or revoked only upon a showing of cause, the city code created a
protectable property interest in the license." Id.
77. Id. at 697, 482 S.E.2d at 360. "The City Code makes it clear that the... licensees
before us do not have a vested right in the law never changing, and are not exempt from
the exercise of the city's police power by its elected officials to further an important
governmental interest." Id.
78. Id. The court, with only Justice Sears dissenting, affirmed the trial judge's grant
of summary judgment to the municipality and denial of injunctive relief to plaintiffs. Id,
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Property
Historically, municipalities obtain much property through the process
of dedication. On occasion, the elements of that process, and their
ramifications, become crucial both to city and citizen. Teague v. City of
Canton7 9 presented such an occasion, with control of a sewer system
hanging in the balance. Teague featured a subdivision developer's effort
to restrain the municipality from tapping into the subdivision's sewer
system.s" Conceding his express offer to dedicate the subdivisions
streets and sewers to the municipality, plaintiff proved the city's express
acceptance of the streets but its express refusal of the sewer system."'
In review, the supreme court emphasized that the municipality had
previously permitted lot owners to tap on to the sewer line, had
processed sewage from the system, and had charged subdivision
residents a sewer fee. s2 The court reasoned that the municipality, "by
its exercise of dominion and control over the sewer lines, impliedly
accepted the offer of dedication before it rejected [plaintiff's] offer of
dedication."83
E.

Contracts
It is familiar "law" that one who deals with a municipality is
presumed to know of any legal limitations upon the city's power to
contract. Ordinarily, that presumption leaves the disappointed party in
whatever position his "invalid" contract has cast him." Both the
F

79. 267 Ga. 679, 482 S.E.2d 237 (1997).
80. Id. at 679, 482 S.E.2d at 237. Plaintiff had developed the subdivision and still
owned a lot there. He sought to prevent the city from constructing a sewer line across his
lot andpermitting the developer of an adjoining subdivision to tap into the sewer line. Id.
81. Id. at 681, 482 S.E.2d at 238. Following plaintiffs express offers of dedication, the
municipality accepted a qait-claim deed for the streets but informed the plaintiff that the
sewer system did not meet its standards. Id.
82. Id. at 682, 482 S.E.2d at 239. The court reviewed the elements of dedication to
include an offer, either express or implied, and an acceptance, either express or implied.

Id.

83. Id. at 681-82, 482 S.E.2d at 238 (emphasis added). The court in this fashion
avoided the plaintiffs argument that the municipality could not impliedly accept the offer
of dedication after it had expressly declined the offer. Id.
84. For background on the general principle, and its operation in the area of "binding
contracts," see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government and Contracts That Bind, 3 GA. L.
REV. 546 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contractsin Local Government Law: Recent
Perspectives, 11 GA. ST. B.J. 148 (1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contractsin Georgia
Local Government Law: Configurationsof Codification,24 GA. L. REV. 95 (1989); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in County Government-Never Mind, GA. COUNTY Gov.
MAG. 28 (Mar. 1991).
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principle and a qualification upon it received service in Walston &
Associates, Inc. v. City ofAtlanta.5 There, plaintiff performed services
for the municipality under an oral agreement with two officials
possessing no authority to bind the city." Without question, the court
of appeals declared, the agreement was invalid (not simply irregular),
the municipality was free to disavow it, and plaintiff was precluded from
breach-of-contract recovery"7 Nevertheless, the court hedged, with the
record evidencing municipal acceptance of his services, plaintiff could
pursue "a quantum meruit action for the reasonable value to the City,
if any, of the services provided."'
G. Liability
Municipal responsibility constituted the concern of many survey-period
plaintiffs; their claims assumed numerous approaches to hurdling the
bar of sovereign immunity.8 The most basic approach,' illustrated
in Koehler v. City of Atlanta,"' sought to classify as a "ministerial
function" the maintenance of a darkened city auditorium where plaintiff
had fallen." Rejecting the effort," the court of appeals scored plain-

85. 224 Ga. App. 482, 480 S.E.2d 917 (1997).
86. Id. at 482, 480 S.E.2d at 918. The services were of a consultative nature, and it
was clear from the city charter that the two officials possessed no municipal contracting
authority. Id.
87. Id. at 483, 480 S.E.2d at 918. "Since this case does not involve an irregular or
unauthorized method of exercising a granted power, but rather action taken by City
officials who had no authority to do so, the unauthorized nature of the contract precludes
[plaintiffs] from asserting estoppel against the City." Id. For treatment of the doctrine of
estoppel in the specific context of local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1985).

88. 224 Ga. App. at 484, 480 S.E.2d at 919. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
grant of summary judgment for the city in breach of contract, but reversed the summary
judgment for the city on the quantum meruit claim. Id.
89. For orientation, perspective, and general chronology on municipal liability
(immunity), see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN

GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Tort Liability:
The 'Crisis' Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 405 (1993).
90.

See R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 5-

57 (4th ed. 1988).
91. 221 Ga. App. 534, 472 S.E.2d 91 (1996).
92. Id. at 534-35, 472 S.E.2d at 91-92. Plaintiff alleged that he had attempted to sit
in the missing seat and alleged both negligence and gross negligence on the part of the
municipality. Id.

93. "Because the sovereign immunity of municipal corporations is waived when they
negligently perform ministerial duties, this case turns on whether operating the Cyclorama
constitutes a governmental function or ministerial duty" Id. at 535, 472 S.E.2d at 91.
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tiff's failure to show "that the Cyclorama was operated primarily as a
source of revenue, rather than as a place of public recreation."
A statutory exception to municipal immunity," featured in Rischack
v. City of Perry," encompasses the negligent maintenance of streets
and sidewalksY There, plaintiff complained of a fall resulting from a
shallow depression in a grassy strip between street and sidewalk."
Although the municipality owned the strip, the court deemed plaintiff's
evidence of negligence to be insufficient.w No evidence indicated the
city's actual knowledge of the defect,'" the court reasoned, and
plaintiff failed
to show "that the city's knowledge ... should be
10 1
inferred."
Municipal liability for street defects does not extend to the construction or maintenance of the state highway system."9 In Duncan v. City
of Macon,'" plaintiff alleged her son's injury at a city intersection,
admittedly a part of the state system, due to negligent design and
construction.'" Rejecting plaintiff's evidence of a municipal maintenance agreement,'" the court held that agreement exclusive of "any
activities related to construction, design, or modifications of a crosswalk
and traffic signal for safety purposes."'"

94. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 92. "'e controlling point is not whether the Cyclorama actually
turns a profit, but its function." Id., 472 S.E.2d at 91. The court thus affirmed the trial
judge's summary judgment for the municipality. Id.
95. O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) (1996).
96. 223 Ga. App. 856, 479 S.E.2d 163 (1996).
97.

See R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA

62-177 (4th ed. 1988).
98. 223 Ga. App. at 856, 479 S.E.2d at 165. Plaintiff fell while walking from the
sidewalk, across the grassy strip, to her car parked on the street. Id., 479 S.E.2d at 16465. The court described the depression as "a gradual depression that appears to be
shallower than six inches [with] grass growing in the depression [giving] it a similar
appearance to the surrounding ground covered by short grass." ld, 479 S.E.2d at 165.
99. Id. at 859, 479 S.E.2d at 166.
100. Id. Plaintiff had "presented no evidence that city workers were on the site at any
time between December 1992 and [plaintiffs] August 1993 fall." Id.
101. Id., 479 S.E.2d at 166-67. "The evidence in this case is simply too speculative to
create a jury issue concerning the age of the depression." Id., 479 S.E.2d at 166. Presiding
Judge McMurray dissented.
102. O.C.GA. § 32-4-93(b) (1996).
103. 221 Ga. App. 710, 472 S.E.2d 455 (1996).
104. Id. at 711, 472 S.E.2d at 456.
105. Id. Plaintiff "appears to argue that because the City agreed to maintain the
intersection, it was responsible for correcting design and construction deficiencies." Id.
106. 1&, 472 S.E.2d at 457. "Because the gravamen of [plaintiffs] claim is based on
negligent design and construction of the crosswalk and traffic signal, and [plaintiff] has not
shown that the City was under any duty to perform these tasks, the trial court did not err
in granting the City's motion on this claim." Id.
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Other statutorily anchored responsibility arises from duties imposed
upon drivers of emergency vehicles."° Wilson v. City of Atlantalce
invoked that responsibility for a claimant struck by a vehicle pursued by
a police officer.'" 9 Reviewing both statutory and case law, the court
extracted the standard of whether the pursuing officer "drove [in]
reckless disregard for the safety of the driving public."" The court
emphasized evidence that public risk existed prior to the chase," and
that the officer neither closely pursued the suspect nor continued the
chase once he determined the public risk was3 excessive."
This
unrefuted evidence revealed no basis for liability."
A familiar effort at escaping tort immunity focuses upon the municipality's alleged creation and maintenance of a nuisance." 4 Even
nuisance actions, however, must honor applicable statutes of limitation.
This lesson devolved from Southfund Partnersv. City of Atlanta,"" a
complaint of airport runway noise and its effect upon plaintiff's
property."'
Viewing the property damage as complete upon the

107. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d) (1997).
108. 223 Ga. App. 144, 476 S.E.2d 892 (1996).
109. Id. at 144, 476 S.E.2d at 892. Plaintiff was a passenger in the vehicle struck by
the vehicle being pursued by the officer. Id.
110. Id at 147, 476 S.E.2d at 895. The court closely examined the supreme court's
decision in Mixon v. City of Warner Robins, 264 Ga. 385, 444 S.E.2d 761 (1994), as well as
the subsequent modification of O.C.G.A. section 40-6-6(d) which occurred after the date of
the collision in issue. 223 Ga. App. at 145-46, 476 S.E.2d at 893-96. The court then
inquired whether the officer violated "the principle of OCGA section 40-6-6(d), recognized
in Mixon, by driving in reckless disregard for the safety of the driving public." Id. at 147,
476 S.E.2d at 895.
111. 223 Ga. App. at 147,476 S.E.2d at 895. "[O]nly minutes before the pursuit began,
the occupants of the vehicle were involved in violent criminal activity." Id.
112. Id. The officer was not "right up on the suspect's bumper," as in Mixon, and he
resumed a normal speed "when he determined that the risk to the driving public became
too great." Id (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 148, 476 S.E.2d at 895-96. Plaintiff "presented no evidence refuting [the
officer's] testimony," and "summary judgment in [defendants] favor was appropriately
granted." Id. at 147-48, 476 S.E.2d at 895-96.
114. For treatment of nuisance liability in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 117-34 (4th ed. 1988);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalLiability in Georgia: The "Nuisance"Nuisance, 12 GA. ST.
B.J. 11 (1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43
MERCER L. REv. 1 (1991).
115. 221 Ga. App. 666, 472 S.E.2d 499 (1996).
116. Id. at 666, 472 S.E.2d at 499. Because of the property's proximity to the airport,
he could not obtain its rezoning and his contract for the sale of the property became null
and void. Id
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runway's operational date," 7 the court declared the nuisance a permanent one.11 As such, it stood capable of full compensation more than
four years prior to plaintiff's2 action," an action consequently barred
by the itatute of limitation.1 0
The nuisance action enjoyed greater success in Hibbs v. City of
Riverdale, 2' a claim for repeated flooding of plaintiffs' homes caused
by a defective drainage system.1" There, the supreme court reversed
the court of appeals' position that a claim founded in negligence could
not succeed in nuisance: 2
"[W]here a municipality negligently
constructs or undertakes to maintain a sewer or drainage system which
causes the repeatedflooding of property, a continuing, abatable nuisance
is established, for which the municipality is liable."' " The lower court
must now determine whether the city controlled or accepted the drainage
125
system "so as to establish a duty... to adequately maintain it."
The nuisance theory also loomed large in a case arising from a
homeowner's complaint of methane gas contamination by the city's
former landfill. 12 In City of Warner Robins v. Holt," 7 the court of

117. Id. The runway had become operational in December 1984, and plaintiff filed his
complaint in 1994. Id.
118. Id. at 667, 472 S.E.2d at 501. The court thus rejected plaintiff's characterization
of the nuisance as a continuing one with every continuance a fresh nuisance for which a
fresh action will lie. Id.
119. Id. at 669, 472 S.E.2d at 502.
Therefore, since the damage complained of became apparent at the time the
runways in question began operating, and since [plaintiff] does not show any
increase in the nuisance occurring within the four-year period prior to the bringing
of its complaint, the nuisance claim is ... barred by the applicable four-year
statute of limitation.
Id. The court reached basically the same conclusion regarding plaintiff's claim in inverse
condemnation. Id. at 668, 472 S.E.2d at 501.
120. Id. at 669, 472 S.E.2d at 502. The court thus sustained the trial judge's grant of
summary judgment for the city. Id.
121. 267 Ga. 337, 478 S.E.2d 121 (1996).
122. Id, at 337, 478 S.E.2d at 121-22. Plaintiffs alleged that the city negligently
approved a developer's plans and construction of an inadequate storm drainage system and
was responsible for the maintenance of the nuisance resulting from it. Id.
123. Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, 219 Ga. App. 457, 458, 465 S.E.2d 486, 489 (1995).
124. Hibbs, 267 Ga. at 338, 478 S.E.2d at 122 (emphasis added). The supreme court
said that although a sole act of approval cannot create nuisance liability, the negligent
maintenance of a system causing repeated flooding can. Id.
125. Id. The supreme court thus reversed summary judgment for the municipality and
remanded for the court of appeals' determination on acceptance creating duty. Id.
126. City of Warner Robins v. Holt, 220 Ga. App. 794, 470 S.E.2d 238 (1996). The
municipality had closed the landfill in 1977; a residential subdivision was developed
adjacent to the site several years later, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division
detected methane gas on one of the subdivision lots in 1987, and an engineering firm found
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appeals reviewed several aspects of a jury's nuisance award. 128 First,

the court rejected the city's characterization of litigation expenses as
punitive and thus inappropriate." 2 The court reasoned that punishment is not the purpose of litigation expenses and that munioipalities
are subject to such awards."se Second, the court found sufficient
evidence for the jury's award for diminution of fair market value
resulting from a permanent nuisance. 8 ' Given the latter award,
however, the court held the jury precluded from also awarding the
homeowner lost rental value for an abatable nuisance. 3 2
City of Atlanta v. Watson 13 illustrated yet another effort to bypass
municipal tort immunity-the "inverse condemnation" exception.'"
Plaintiffs claimed unequal treatment by the city of their apartments

near the municipal airport, as contrasted with similarly located single-

that the landfill was encroaching upon other lots in 1989. Id. at 794, 470 S.E.2d at 238.
127. 220 Ga. App. 794, 470 S.E.2d 238 (1996).
128. Id. at 795, 470 S.E.2d at 240. Plaintiff had moved out of his house in 1990, sued
the municipality, and a jury had awarded plaintiff damages on a number of items. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. "Though awards of litigation expenses and attorney fees may often have a
somewhat punitive effect on the party against whom they are awarded, to punish or
penalize is not their purpose." Id.
131. Id. at 797,470 S.E.2d at 241. There was evidence that removal ofthe house would
be necessary to solve the problem, and that the installation of a barrier and ventilation
system would render plaintiff's property unmarketable. "Though contradicted by other
evidence, this evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude the nuisance is
permanent." Id.
132. Id. at 796, 470 S.E.2d at 241. "If the nuisance is permanent, the measure of
damages is the diminution of fair market value of the property. If the nuisance is abatable,
the measure of damages is lost rental value for so long as the nuisance is allowed to
continue." Id. Here, "[t]he greater subsumes the lesser, and, in this case, it is the lesser
claim for lost rental value which should not have been included in the judgment." Id. at
797, 470 S.E.2d at 241. The court also upheld an award for emotional distress as a result
of the nuisance. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 241-42.
Almost a year later, the court of appeals decided a second case arising from the same
occurrence. In Hammond v. City of Warner Robins, 224 Ga. App. 684, 482 S.E.2d 422
(1997), plaintiff's subdivision lot was directly across the street from that of plaintiff Holt
in the case above treated. Apparently, tests were less conclusive as to the presence of
methane gas upon plaintiff's property, and she had not been forced to abandon it. Id. at
685-86, 482 S.E.2d at 425. Reviewing the evidence, the court reversed the trial judge's
grant of the city's motion for summary judgment: "In the case sub judice, there is
conflicting evidence regarding the elements of a nuisance, and summary judgement should
be denied." Id. at 692, 482 S.E.2d at 429. Judge Beasley dissented.
133. 267 Ga. 185, 475 S.E.2d 896 (1996).
134. For treatment of aspects of this exception, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILMY IN GEORGIA 134-43 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Local Government Liability Limitations: "Causation"is to Tort as "Police Power' is to
Eminent Domain, URBAN GA. 20 (Jan.-Feb. 1987).
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family dwellings."
Unlike the latter, plaintiffs' properties were
excluded from municipal purchase under the city's "Noise Compatibility
Program."35 Reversing the court of appeals,3 7 the supreme court
declared municipal treatment of multi-family dwellings not violative of
plaintiffs' equal protection." Given the limited funds available for the
program, the city's classifications were reasonable. 39 They bore "a
rational relationship to the legitimate governmental purpose of reducing
land use incompatible with airport noise in a sound and responsible
fiscal manner, while simultaneously avoiding the virtual elimination of
[a neighboring municipality's] residential basis and the resulting
negative impact on its business community and infrastructure.""4 °
A final possibility for immunity avoidance, the "constitutional
tort,"'"' surfaced in Watson v. Mayor of Savannah.42 There, plaintiff

135. 267 Ga. at 185, 475 S.E.2d at 896. Plaintiffs claimed inverse condemnation of
their properties based on a violation of equal protection under the Georgia constitution.
Id.
136. Id. at 185-86, 475 S.E.2d at 898. The city's efforts took place under a federal
program for airports receiving federal funding, seeking to reduce existing land uses
incompatible with airport noise. Id. See 49 U.S.C § 47504(b)(1XB) (1997).
137. Watson v. City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. App. 704,466 S.E.2d 229 (1995). The supreme
court viewed the court of appeals to have erred in inquiring only into the city's claim that
multi-family residences were more compatible with airport noise than single family
residences. Rather, the lower court should have examined "the other justifications
supported by the record in defense of the City's classification between single and multifamily residences." 267 Ga. at 188, 475 S.E.2d at 900.
138. 267 Ga. at 187,475 S.E.2d at 899. The classification not being "suspect," the court
held the "rational basis test" appropriate in determining whether the classification "bears
a reasonable relationship to a legitimate purpose of government." Id.
139. Id. at 190, 475 S.E.2d at 901. The city had funds sufficient only to purchase
single-family residences, and its decision left open the possibility that other residences
might be purchased during a later phase of the program. Id.
140. Id.
Had the City effectively relocated over 81,000 people from College Park to other
communities at once, rather than in stages, there would have been no opportunity
for the redevelopment of land formerly occupied by single-family residences with
the establishment of businesses that are compatible with airport noise-a stated
goal of both the federal noise abatement program and the City's Program.
Id. at 189, 475 S.E.2d at 900-01. Thus, the court concluded, "the classification drawn by
the City between the two types of residences does not violate the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection, and we reverse the contrary ruling by the Court of Appeals." Id. at
190, 475 S.E.2d at 901.
141. The "constitutional tort" emerges from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994), providing a civil action for governmental violations of constitutional
protections. For treatment of this statute by both federal and state courts in respect to
Georgia local governments, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAWS ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW "PERSONS" (1984). For an
exclusive focus upon the statute in the Georgia appellate courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
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pursued the federal remedy for injuries received in an altercation with
an off-duty police officer."
Emphasizing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exactions,' the court of appeals provided the claim summary disposition.
"[T]here is simply no evidence in the record sufficient to show that [the
officer's] off-duty altercation with [plaintiffi was the result of an
impermissible or corrupt policy which was intentional and deliberate."'
On that rationale, the court sustained the municipality's
summary judgment.'4
Municipal liability's "ante litem" notice requirement' 47 found confirmation in Goen v. City of Atlanta,'" an action for damage to plaintiffs'
land in expanding the city airport. 149 First, the court refuted plaintiffs'
reliance upon a notice provided the city by another property owner for
himself and "all other persons similarly situated. " "s° That notice did
not advise the city "of the claims of these appellants or of the time,
place, and extent of injury as required by [the statute]." 5' Second, the
court rejected plaintiffs' argument of municipal waiver for failing to
assert the notice issue in the pretrial order: 62 "[Ainte litem notice is
a condition precedent to filing suit against a city... and the failure to
give such notice cannot be waived as appellants assert."'53

Local Government and ConstitutionalTorts: In the Georgia Courts, 49 MERCER L. REv. 1
(1997).
142. 223 Ga, App. 399, 477 S.E.2d 667 (1996).
143. Id. at 399, 477 S.E.2d at 667. The altercation occurred in a nightclub where
plaintiff was a patron and when the police officer was moonlighting as a security guard in
a neighboring club. Id.
144. Id. at 402, 477 S.E.2d at 669. I.e., the "respondeat superior" limitation, and, in
the context of insufficient training, the reflection of"'deliberate indifference' to the rights
of the inhabitants." Id., 477 S.E.2d at 670.
145. Id. at 402, 477 S.E.2d at 670.
146. Id.
147. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (1991). For treatment of the statute, its history, and its
application in cases, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABIuTY

IN GEORGIA 145-74 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia MunicipalTort Liability:
Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA. L. REv. 134 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Ante Litem Notice: Cause
for Pause, URBAN GA. MAG. 24 (Oct. 1978).
148. 224 Ga. App. 484, 481 S.E.2d 244 (1997).
149. Id. at 485, 481 S.E.2d at 244. Plaintiffs alleged that the municipality had
trespassed on, and caused damage to, their property while expanding the city airport. Id,
150. Id., 481 S.E.2d at 245. The notice was provided by yet another property owner in
the same area. The plaintiffs urged it to constitute substantial compliance with the notice
requirement. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id. "Even though the City raised the defense that ante litem notice was not given,
no motion to dismiss was filed and the issue was not identified in the pretrial order." Id.
153. Id. at 486, 481 S.E.2d at 246. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of
the city's motions for judgment on the pleadings. Id.
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H, Zoning
The supreme court's municipal zoning decision of the era was a
procedural one. In Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette &
Amusement Services, Inc., " the property owner claimed the city's

rezoning of his land to result in inverse condemnation.'55 Delineating
between police power and eminent domain,'" the court viewed the
latter to require "a determination that the new zoning ordinance was
unconstitutional as applied." 5 " Accordingly, "unless it would be futile
to do so, a litigant must first petition the local authorities for relief by
rezoning before asking a court to find that a zoning ordinance is
unconstitutional as applied to the litigant's property."'" Because
plaintiff had failed to show futility, its "collateral attack on the rezoning
...

is untimely and.., seeks to circumvent the requirement to exhaust

available administrative remedies."5" The court thus declared plaintiff's action "procedurally barred. " "°
L

Authorities

Although housing authorities do not enjoy governmental immunity,'6 ' actions against them must meet the basic requirements of tort

law. The "duty" requirement proved pivotal in two contests of the
period. Scott v. Housing Authority of Glennville' featured a tenant's

action for injury by a stray bullet from a gun fight arising from a drug
transaction in defendant's complex.'" Holding defendant's duty of
protection to rest upon knowledge of prior similar incidents on the
premises,'" the court of appeals probed plaintiff's evidence.'
154. 267 Ga. 173, 476 S.E.2d 581 (1996).
155. Id. at 173, 476 S.E.2d at 581. Plaintiff alleged uncompensated loss of rental
income and in the market value of its property as a result of the zoning change. Id.
156. For emphasis upon that distinction, and its ramifications, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Local Government Liability Limitations: "Causation"is to Tort as "PolicePower* is to
Eminent Domain, URBAN GA. MAG. 20 (Jan.-Feb., 1987).
157. 267 Ga. at 174, 476 S.E.2d at 582.
158. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 582-83.
159. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 583.
160. Id. With Justice Carley dissenting without opinion, the court reversed the trial
judge's denial of the city's motion to dismiss. Id.
161. See the discussion in R. Perry Sentell, Jr., 'Sue and Be Sued' in Georgia Local
Government Law: A Vignette of Vicissitudes, 41 MERCER L. REV. 13 (1989).
162. 223 Ga. App. 216, 477 S.E.2d 325 (1996).
163. Id. at 216, 477 S.E.2d at 325. Plaintiff alleged that she was hit while attempting
to secure the safety of her children after the gun fight erupted. Id.
164. Id., 477 S.E.2d at 326. "'Without foreseeability that a criminal act will occur, no
duty on the part of the proprietor to exercise ordinary care to prevent that act arises.'" Id.
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Rejecting references to domestic shootings'" and to incidents investigated by police but unknown to defendant," the court concluded that
"the incidents of which defendant may have had knowledge were not
substantially
similar to the gun battle which caused plaintiff's inju168
ry

"

The claimant enjoyed greater success on the duty issue in Housing
Authority of Atlanta v. Jefferson,6 9 an action for the authority's failure
to provide a smoke detector in a house qualified for its rental program. 7 ' Rejecting defendant's no-duty argument, the court viewed
federal regulations to require compliance with a municipal ordinance
Holding the housing authority a
imposing the responsibility."'
residence "owner" under the ordinance,7 2 the court found a violation
of the "statutory duty" to inspect for (and provide) the detector. 7 '
II.

COUNTIES

A.

Officers and Employees
Logically, county tax administration assumes high profile among the
most controversial of local government functions. That controversy often

(quoting Days Inn v. Matt, 265 Ga. 235, 236, 454 S.E.2d 507, 508 (1995)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 217, 477 S.E.2d at 327. "W]e do not find this apparent domestic dispute
to be substantially similar to the incident in which plaintiff was injured." Id.
167. Id. "Ofthe incidents in the police reports, defendant had knowledge of three, a
domestic dispute, a theft by taking, and a trespass. None of the incidents was substantially similar to the incident in which plaintiff was injured." Id.
168. Id. The court said that although the prior incident need not be identical, it must
be sufficient "to have put an ordinarily prudent person on notice that the housing complex
tenants were facing increased risk." Id. at 218, 477 S.E.2d at 327. The court affirmed the
trial judge's grant of summary judgment for defendant. Id.
169. 223 Ga. App. 60, 476 S.E.2d 831 (1996).
170. Id. at 60, 476 S.E.2d at 832. Plaintiffs three-year-old child was injured in a fire
in a house which plaintiff had rented. "Prior to the rental, the house was inspected by [the
authority], acting in its capacity as the area Section 8 administrator. [The authority] found
the house was suitable for participation in the program, and [the child's] family received
Section 8 assistance to rent the dwelling." Id.
171. Id The court cited to O.C.G.A. section 8-3-7, subjecting housing authority projects
to ordinances of the locality in which the housing project is located, and to a municipal
ordinance requiring owners to provide smoke detectors in residential dwellings prior to
their rental. Id. at 60-61, 476 S.E.2d at 832-33.
172. Id. at 61, 476 S.E.2d at 833. "Clearly, in its capacity as the area administrator,
[the housing authority] exercised significant control over the [plaintiffs] dwelling." Id.
173. I. The court also held that whether the lack of a smoke detector contributed to
the child's injuries was a jury question. Id Accordingly, the court sustained the trial
judge's refusal to grant the housing authority's motion for summary judgment. Id.
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explodes into personnel upheavals which then result in litigation. The
supreme court considered such litigation in Swafford v. Dade County
Board of Commissioners,74 a challenge by the chair of the board of tax
assessors to his removal for cause. 7 ' Preliminarily, the court overruled two prior decisions' and held appeals from such removals to
require compliance with discretionary appeal procedures.'77 Substantively, the court rejected the challenger's due process argument: it was
immaterial that the body (commissioners) which brought the chair's
fitness for office into question was also the body to decide the question." 8 Whether or not the commissioners had prejudged the case,
they were the legislatively designated body to hear the procedure. 9
The court of appeals reviewed a challenge by tax assessors in Cashin
v. Harman"s to a removal prompted by the assessors' failure to timely
file a tax digest.' 8 ' Examining the deadline statute,' the court held
it immaterial whether the duty created was mandatory or directory."s
In either event, the assessors' failure to meet the deadline was sufficient
to confer removal-for-cause discretion upon the county commissioners.184

174. 266 Ga. 646, 469 S.E.2d 666 (1996).
175. Id. at 646, 469 S.E.2d at 666. The removal was effected under O.C.G.A. section
48-5-295. Id.
176. Geron v. Calibre Cos., 250 Ga. 213, 296 S.E.2d 602 (1982); Parsons v. Chatham
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 204 Ga. App. 130, 418 S.E.2d 459 (1992).
177. 266 Ga. at 647, 469 S.E.2d at 668. The court reasoned that although county
commissioners also function as a legislative body, their removal determination is
equivalent to an administrative function, and an appeal requires compliance with
discretionary appeal procedures under O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35(aX1). Id.
178. Id. This was challenger's rationale for a due process attack upon O.C.G.A. section
48-5-295. Id.
179. Id. The court relied upon Hill v. Johnson, 214 Ga. 417, 105 S.E.2d 309 (1958).
Additionally, the court reviewed the evidence presented and rejected challenger's
contention that it was insufficient to warrant his removal. Id.
180. 223 Ga. App. 301, 477 S.E.2d 433 (1996).
181. Id. at 302, 477 S.E.2d at 433. The commissioners effected the removal for cause
under O.C.G.A. section 48-5-295. Id.
182. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-302 (1991).
183. 223 Ga. App. at 302-03,477 S.E.2d at 434. "'The duty under [O.C.G.A. section 485-302J is such a duty "imposed upon them by law" whether it is a mandatory or merely a
directory duty.'" Id. (quoting Kirton v. Biggers, 135 Ga. App. 416,418,218 S.E.2d 113, 116
(1975)).
184. Id. at 303, 477 S.E.2d at 434. "The superior court correctly held that the tax
assessors' failure to complete the digest by the statutory deadline did not mandate their
removal, but that this breach of duty gave the commission discretion to remove them." Id.
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A terminated employee of the tax commissioner's office fared no better
in Jones v. Chatham County,"5 a challenge founded both on due
process and breach of contract.'M As to the former, the court held that
failure to provide challenger a pre-termination hearing was remedied by
an opportunity for a post-termination hearing some five months
later. 7 On the breach-of-contract issue, the court rejected challenger's
reliance upon provisions of the personnel manual: "[inder Georgia law,
personnel manuals stating that employees can be terminated only for
cause and setting
forth termination procedures are not contracts of
ss
employment."'
In Mayo v. Fulton County, 9 a deputy sheriff unsuccessfully challenged his termination as a result of testing positive for cocaine.'"
The court held the county sheriff to possess both inherent 9 ' and
authorized"9 powers to implement random drug testing. Moreover,
the court decided, the sheriff had afforded sufficient prior notice by two

185. 223 Ga. App. 455, 477 S.E.2d 889 (1996).
186. Id. at 455, 477 S.E.2d at 889. Plaintiff was charged with unacceptable personal
conduct, resigned, but then brought this action alleging that she had been invalidly
terminated. Id.
187. Id. at 458, 477 S.E.2d at 892. The court reasoned that the state may cure a
procedural due process violation by providing a later procedural remedy; "nor did the fivemonth delay render the remedy offered by the state constitutionally inadequate." Id.
188. Id. at 459, 477 S.E.2d at 893. Assuming due process requirements are met, the
court said, "failure to follow the termination procedures contained in [the personnel
manual] is not actionable." Id.
Another removal controversy of the period, Lee v. Gore, 221 Ga. App. 632, 472 S.E.2d 164
(1996), involved only the appropriate periods of limitation. There, a removed county tax
appraiser brought claims in libel, slander, conspiracy to libel and slander, and interference
with employment, against individuals publishing a petition to dismiss plaintiff. ld. at 632,
472 S.E.2d at 164. The court of appeals held that the first three claims were barred by a
one-year period of limitation, but that the claim of interference with employment alleged
violation of a property right governed by a four-year limitation period. Id. at 635, 472
S.E.2d at 167-68. For treatment of the popularity of defamation in the local government
context, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Defamation in GeorgiaLocal Government Law: A Brief
History, 16 GA. L. REV. 627 (1982).
189. 220 Ga. App. 825, 470 S.E.2d 258 (1996).
190. Id. at 825, 470 S.E.2d at 258.
191. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 259. The court termed the sheriff a constitutional officer with
inherent authority to implement public safety policies, including testing of personnel who
carry weapons "because drug use by them undermines public confidence in the integrity
of the Sheriffs Office and poses a danger to fellow employees, inmates and the public at
large." Id.
192. Id. The court held county personnel regulations to authorize the sheriff to
implement drug screening as a means of enforcing a provision forbidding employees from
being on duty while*under the influence of intoxicating drugs. Id.
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memos to all county employees that a positive test would mandate
dismissal.1'
Finally, the court turned a deaf ear in Jellico v. Effingham County'
to a building inspector's charge of "constructive wrongful termination."
The court reviewed plaintiff's allegations that building certificates were
being improperly issued beyond his control, and that he resigned for fear
of potential liability.'m Even so, the court concluded, plaintiff was
merely 19an "at will" employee who could not sue for wrongful discharge. 6
B. Elections
Electors who receive assistance in voting are required to take an oath
describing the reason for assistance. 1 Violation of that requirement,
the supreme court held in McCranie v. Mullis,' can invalidate the
election. l 99 Finding the irregularity to affect a sufficient number of
ballots to cast doubt upon the result, 2 ° the court voided a primary
election for county commissioner and ordered that a new election be
held.'0 1

193. Id. at 826, 470 S.E.2d at 260. Plaintiff had admitted during his hearing that he
had received the memos; thus, "we conclude that he had adequate notice of the random
drug test policy." Id. The court affirmed the trial judge in upholding plaintiffs
termination. Id.
194. 221 Ga. App. 252, 471 S.E.2d 36 (1996).
195. Id at 252, 471 S.E.2d at 36. Plaintiff alleged that his supervisor was issuing the
permits and that neither the supervisor nor the county commissioners would rectify the
situation. Id.
196. Id. at 253-54, 471 S.E.2d at 38. The court reasoned as follows: "[Itis undisputed
that the legislature has not created a specific public policy exception to OCGA [section] 347-1 that would allow plaintiff to recover on his claim of constructive wrongful termination.'
Id. The court rejected plaintiff's plea that it declare a public policy exception to the rule,
and affirmed the trial judge's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. Id.
197. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409 (1993). The only reasons rendering assistance permissible are
inability to read english and physical disability. Id.
198. 267 Ga. 416, 478 S.E.2d 377 (1996).
199. I& at 416, 478 S.E.2d at 377. Other irregularities included significant disparities
among precincts in the number of assisted voters, the fact that many who signed their
voter certificates then marked the oath for assistance with an "X," the fact that one
individual alone assisted some 142 voters who cast absentee ballots, and the fact that this
individual was married to the secretary of the candidate. I0. at 417, 478 S.E.2d at 379.
200. Id. at 417, 478 S.E.2d at 379. "We agree with the trial court that these
irregularities, which affect well over 163 ballots [the agreed upon number sufficient to cast
doubt on the election], are sufficient to cast doubt on the result of the election.' Id
201. Id. Chief Justice Benham dissented without opinion.
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Openness

Open meetings and open records provide basic assurances of fairness
in the conduct of local government; they lend democratic flavor to the
tending of the public's business. 202 Beck v. Crisp County Zoning Board
of Appeals'co focused upon the meeting of a county zoning board which
granted a conditional use permit for an airstrip. In issue were the
board's actions in holding a "public hearing" on the petition for the
permit, announcing that the hearing was "adjourned," closing the doors
of the meeting room, and voting on the permit.'
Under the Open
Meetings Act,' the court of appeals declared, those actions were
illegal .2 1 "The audience had the right to be present for the remainder
of the meeting which included the vote and decision on the conditional
use permit involved. There was no need or basis to 'adjourn' the public
hearing. The entire meeting was required to be public."
Accordingly, the court invalidated the zoning board's issuance of the permit. s
D. Property
A local government may use its property in many ways; those uses
may well fall subject to different statutory requirements. Swims u.
Fulton Countys2 9 contested an exchange of property between govern-

202. For background, and an early discussion of Georgia law on the matter, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness"in Local Government Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97
(1978).
203. 221 Ga. App. 801, 472 S.E.2d 558 (1996).
204. Id. at 801,472 S.E.2d at 558. Upon the chair's announcing that the public hearing
was adjourned, the audience left the room before the doors were closed and the vote taken.

Id. at 803, 472 S.E.2d at 559.
205. O.C.GA. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1994).
206. 221 Ga. App. at 803, 472 S.E.2d at 560. The court noted O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(c)
(1994): "The public at all times shall be afforded iccess to meetings declared open to the
public pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section." In this case, said the court,
not only did the Zoning Board chairman unnecessarily announce that the public
hearing was adjourned, he was pointedly vague as to the timing of the events
which were to follow the "public" hearing. He specifically failed to advise the
audience it was entitled to remain for the balance of the agenda, and the doors
were closed when the audience left the room.

221 Ga. App. at 803, 472 S.E.2d at 560.
207. 221 Ga. App. at 803, 472 S.E.2d at 560.
208. Id. at 804, 472 S.E.2d at 560. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. section 50-14-1(b):
"'Any ... official action of an agency adopted... at a meeting which is not open to the
public as required by this chapter shall not be binding.'" Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b)
(1994)).

209. 267 Ga. 94, 475 S.E.2d 597 (1996).
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ments, seeking to set aside the resulting conveyance to the county. 10
The supreme court reviewed the matter by drawing a clear delineation
between "the concepts of exchange and disposal."211 Only the latter,
the court held, was subject to the requirements that the former owner
be afforded notice and the right of repurchase.1 2 As for the transaction in issue, involving land condemned by the Department of Transporcounty, the previous
tation and then exchanged for land owned by21the
8
owner possessed no interest in the procedure.
Defendant claimed the county property featured in West v. Fulton
County214 as a result of a tax sale, a sale the county challenged as
ineffective to pass title.215 In looking to the statute governing county
sales, the court focused upon the requirement that the sale proceed by
"order entered on [the county] minutes."21" If, as in this case, no such
resolution appeared on the minutes, "'the purported conveyance did not
pass[] title to the land therein described.'" 2 7 Refusing to find an

210. Id. at 95, 475 S.E.2d at 598. The Department of Transportation had condemned
land for improving a road and then quit-claimed a part of the land to the defendant county
for other property then owned by the county. Plaintiff, former owner of the condemned
property, claimed the rights of notice and repurchase and thus challenged the validity of
the conveyance to the county. Id.
211. Id. at 96, 475 S.E.2d at 598.
212. Id. at 95-96,475 S.E.2d at 598. Disposals were governed by O.C.G-A. section 32-74, the court asserted, and exchanges by O.C.G-A. section 32-3-3(b). Id. Those statutes, the
court held, must be viewed in pari materia. Id. For treatment of this inordinately popular
approach to statutory interpretation in Georgia, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IN GEORGIA: THE DOCTRINE OF IN PARI MATERIA (1996).
213. 267 Ga. at 95, 475 S.E.2d at 598. The right to exchange the property "[was
completely] unencumbered by any procedural requirements associated with the disposal
of property.' Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of the county's motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 96, 475 S.E.2d at 598.
214. 267 Ga. 456, 479 S.E.2d 722 (1997).
215. Id. at 456-57, 479 S.E.2d at 722-23. The county had purchased the property with
recorded deed, and the county tax commissioner mistakenly purported to sell the property
to the defendant for unpaid taxes. Here the county brought the action to determine
ownership. Id.
216. Id. at 457, 479 S.E.2d at 722 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-9-2 (1993)).
217. Id. at 457, 479 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting Head v. Lee, 203 Ga. 191, 201, 45 S.E.2d
666, 673 (1947)). The court analogized to the line of cases invalidating county contracts
that are not entered on the minutes as required by a comparable statute, O.C.GA. section
36-10-1. Id. at 457, 479 S.E.2d at 723. For treatment of the latter statute, and the cases
applying it in Georgia county law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., County Contracts in Georgia:
"Written and Entered," 32 MERCER L. REV. 283 (1980).
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exception for tax, sales,1 the219court declared the conveyance ineffective
and the county's title intact.
E. Liability
County liability emerged as local government law's most prolific
In one fashion or another, claimants
subject of the survey period.'
attributed the majority of their ills to counties and county officers. In
Kordares v. Gwinnett County, 1 the attribution appeared in a wrongful
death action for county negligence in failing to perform a subsurface
Assuming the traditional position, the court
inspection of a bridge.'
adopted
the trial judge's opinion' that the county
simply
of appeals
was immune from negligence liability,' and that plaintiff had cited
no statute specifically waiving that immunity for bridges."2s
The missing element of "duty" proved fatal to the negligence claim in
Washington u. Jefferson County,22s an action for the death of plaintiffs
son caused by a county arrestee out on bail. 2' The court of appeals
condemned plaintiff's claim for two reasons: first, the county possessed

218. 267 Ga. at 457, 479 S.E.2d at 723. "Thus, the fact that the purported sale of
county-owned property in this case was by tax sale does not operate to negate or otherwise
nullify the provisions of O.C.G-A. [section] 36-9-2." Id.
219. Id. at 458, 479 S.E.2d at 723. Justice Carley dissented on grounds that the
general sales statutes "have no application where, as here, the county property was the
subject of a tax levy." Id (Carley, J., dissenting).
220. For treatment of the subject, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government
Tort Liability: The 'Crisis' Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
221. 220 Ga. App. 848, 470 S.E.2d 479 (1996).
222. Id. at 848, 470 S.E.2d at 479-80. Plaintiffs alleged that the bridge had been
constructed with inadequate footings, that the county had failed to perform a subsurface
inspection, and that the bridge had partially collapsed killing the decedent. Id.
223. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 479. The court expressly adopted the trial judge's opinion, set
out verbatim, as its own. Id.
224. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 480. Under the 1991 constitutional amendment (GA. CONST. art.
I, § II, para. IX), the court asserted, the county was immune unless a statute specifically
waived that immunity. Id.
225. Id. at 850, 470 S.E.2d at 481. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that O.C.G.A.
section 32-441 constituted a waiver for county bridges; rather, "the Court finds no
language in [section] 32-4-41 indicating that a county is liable for defective bridges, and
any waiver of sovereign immunity must be explicit." Id. (citations omitted). The court thus
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the county. Id. at 851, 470 S.E.2d
at 482.
226. 221 Ga. App. 81, 470 S.E.2d 714 (1996).
227. Id. at 81, 470 S.E.2d at 714. Four months after his arrest, while out on bail on
charges of assault and terroristic threats, the arrestee fought with plaintiffs son and shot
him. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 715. "The gravamen of [plaintiffs] complaint is that [the arresteel
should not have been released from jail because he was too dangerous." Id.
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no control over the bail process;' and second, the county could not be
held liable for failing to perform its general "public duty" to provide
police protection." On the latter issue, the court marked the absence
of a necessary "special relationship" between the county and the
decedent.'
The "public duty" doctrine later experienced extreme turbulence in
m ' an action for a county deputy sheriff's interHamilton v. Cannon,"
ruption of a private rescue attempt at a municipal swimming pool.'
There, the supreme court responded to a question from the Eleventh
Circuit: "Does the 'public duty doctrine' established in City of Rome
apply outside the police protection context and in the circumstances of
this case?' 2 Conveying a most summary but negative answer, a bare
majority of the supreme court restricted its City ofRome decision to "the
situation in that case."' So restricted, and absent a special relationship, the local government "may not be held liable for its failure to

228. Id. at 82, 470 S.E.2d at 715. "A superior court judge, not a sheriff or county,
controls the bail procedure for aggravated assault, the offense for which [the arrestee]
obtained bond." Id.
229. Id. Plaintiff had to show that the County... had a special relationship with him,
apart from that owed to the general public and that this special relationship created a
special duty owed to him which the County... then breached causing his injury.' Id.
230. Id.
A special relationship has three requirements: "(1) an explicit assurance by the
[government entity] through promises or actions, that it would act on behalf of the
injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of the [government entity] that inaction
could lead to harm; and, (3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured
party on the [government entity's] affirmative undertaking."
Id. (quoting City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 29, 426 S.E.2d 861, 863 (1993)).
231. 267 Ga. 655, 482 S.E.2d 370 (1997).
232. Id. at 655, 482 S.E.2d at 371. Plaintiff alleged that the deputy arrived at the pool
in response to an emergency call and interrupted a pool patron in administering CPR to
plaintiffs decedent who had collapsed. CPR was later resumed when the city police chief
arrived, but decedent was pronounced dead at the hospital. Plaintiff sued in the federal
court, asserting both federal and state claims, and named as defendants the county, its
sheriff and deputy, the city and its pool manager and lifeguard. The district court granted
summary judgment to defendants, based on the public duty doctrine (864 F. Supp. 1332
(1994)); and the Eleventh Circuit certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court (80
F.3d 1525 (1996)). 267 Ga. at 655, 482 S.E.2d at 370.
233. 267 Ga. at 655, 482 S.E.2d at 372 (citing City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26,426
S.E.2d 861 (1993)).
234. Id. at 656, 482 S.E.2d at 372. The court noted that in City of Rome v. Jordan,it
had held that a municipality was not liable "to plaintiff, an assault victim, for the failure
to respond to an emergency call made by members of the victim's family who had
telephoned police when they learned a man they feared posed a threat of harm to the
plaintiff's safety was at the plaintiffs home." 267 Ga. at 656, 482 S.E.2d at 372.
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provide police protection based on a general duty to protect the
public.'
Otherwise, the court proffered, the "public duty" doctrine
does not apply "outside the police protection context" and did not
preclude plaintiff's claim for the deputy sheriff's conduct in Hamilton.'
On occasion, the county may escape liability via basic agency
principles. In Brown v. Jackson,' for example, the court of appeals
held that two defendant deputy sheriffs were employees of the sheriff
and not the county "at all times relevant to this [wrongful death]
case."'
Consequently, the county sheriff, rather than the county
itself, "would have been the proper party" for suit under a theory of
respondeat superior.
Whitley v. Gwinnett County2 ° involved yet another preliminary
issue: the requisite affidavit for a professional malpractice claim. 1
Specifically, a wrongful death claimant targeted the county's failure to
formally request a traffic control signal for the fatal intersection.24 2
On grounds that the process for obtaining traffic control signals required
county engineers to exercise "professional skill and judgment,"m4 the

235. Id. The court relied upon its more recent decision in Departmentof Transportation
v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 471 S.E.2d 849 (1996).
236. 267 Ga. at 656, 482 S.E.2d at 372. In a dissenting opinion for three justices,
Presiding Justice Fletcher disagreed with the majority's decision that the public duty
doctrine was limited to police protection: "I would hold that the public duty doctrine
applies to police and other public employees who provide police services. These services
include preserving public order; promoting public health, safety, and morals; and preventing, detecting and punishing crime." Id. at 658,482 S.E.2d at 374 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
The dissent concluded that "the public duty doctrine applies to claims against the county,
but that a special relationship was established between [decedent] and the deputy sheriff
under the circumstances of this case." Id. at 664, 482 S.E.2d at 377.
237. 221 Ga. App. 200, 470 S.E.2d 786 (1996).
238. Id. at 201, 470 S.E.2d at 787. Plaintiffs had sued the county and both deputies;
the trial judge had granted summary judgment for the deputies on grounds of official
immunity, but had refused the county's motion for summary judgment. Id.
239. Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's denial of the county's motion for
summary judgment. Id.
240. 221 Ga. App. 18, 470 S.E.2d 724 (1996).
241. O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 (1993) provides that the affidavit of an expert specifying
acts of professional negligence must accompany a malpractice plaintiffs complaint.
242. 221 Ga. App. at 18, 470 S.E.2d at 724. Plaintiffs decedent had been killed when
he proceeded into a county intersection and was struck by a county police officer on routine
patrol. Plaintiff argued that her negligent maintenance claim did not amount to a claim
of professional malpractice. Id.
243. Id. at 19, 470 S.E.2d at 727 (citations omitted). "The application process required
the County DOT's engineers to prepare a traffic control study justifying the necessity of the
traffic control device. These engineers were also required to submit a proposal for the
signal's design to accompany the application.' Id.
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court held plaintiff's complaint to exceed charges of simple negligence.'
Accordingly, omission of the affidavit was fatal to the
claim." 5
Several claimants raised the prospect of immunity waiver by statutory
authorization of liability insurance. 2" Rawls u. Bulloch County School
District"7 featured the statute requiring school boards to purchase
insurance covering students injured in school bus accidents.' " There,
a student sought recovery for the school district's alleged failure to
protect him from injury by a fellow student.' " Although the campus
attack apparently resulted from an altercation on the school bus several
days earlier,25 ' the court of appeals held the incident outside the
province of the insurance statute 251 and affirmed summary judgment
for the school district.252
*Robertsu. Burke County School District' focused upon the district's
"comprehensive liability policy" with a coverage exclusion for injury
arising from the "use" of a vehicle. 2 " Roberts encompassed an action
for the death of plaintiffs' child who was struck and killed after walking
four-tenths of a mile from the point where the school bus discharged

244. Id. "Furthermore, the fact that an expert witness would be required to prove the
claim against the County DOT is further proof that [plaintiff's] allegations are not of simple
negligence." Id
245. Id. The court affirmed the trial judge's grant of the county's motion for summary
judgment. Id.
246. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort LiabilityInsurancein GeorgiaLocal
Government Law, 24 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1973).
247. 223 Ga. App. 234, 477 S.E.2d 383 (1996).
248. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1090 (1996).
249. 223 Ga. App. at 235, 477 S.E.2d at 384. Plaintiff was attacked by a fellow student
with a hammer after arriving at school and while walking toward the school building. Id.
250. Id. At that time, the students had argued and scuffled on the bus, and the
attacker had threatened plaintiff. Id.
251. Id., 477 S.E.2d at 385. "No bus was involved in a collision or accident in this
case, and OCGA [section] 20-2-1090 says nothing about a waiver of sovereign immunity or
the extent of any such waiver." Id.
252. Id. at 235-36,477 S.E.2d at 385. The court noted that under the 1991 amendment
to the Georgia Constitution (art. I, § II, para. IX), county and school district immunity can
be waived only by a statute explicitly so providing. Id. at 235, 477 S.E.2d at 385.
253. 267 Ga. 665, 482 S.E.2d 282 (1997).
254. Id. at 666, 482 S.E.2d at 284. Apparently, there was no argument over the
district's authority to obtain this policy, and hence waive its immunity, under the motor
vehicle liability insurance statute (O.C.G-.A section 33-24-51 (1996)) empowering local
governments to obtain liability insurance for, ironically, the use of its motor vehicles. In
fact, the court noted, the district also possessed such a policy, but it was not before the
court in this case. Id. at 668-69, 482 S.E.2d at 286.
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Reversing the court of appeals," the supreme court held
him.'
that the child's death "could not be said to have arisen from the 'use' of
the school bus within the contemplation of' the policy exclusion. " '
The court of appeals considered two instances of alleged immunity
waiver under the motor vehicle liability insurance statute.2" Blumsack v. Bartow County 9 involved a decedent struck by an insured
county truck while being test-driven by a mechanic.' ° Because the
county's insurance policy expressly excluded coverage for anyone
repairing the truck, the county was uninsured for the incident.'
Accordingly, the court held, the insurance statute had not waived the
county's sovereign immunity on behalf of the decedent.'
Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co.' presented a prison inmate's claim
for injury in a fall from a county backhoe.2" Holding that the motor
vehicle insurance statute permitted the county to obtain a general

255. I& at 666, 482 S.E.2d at 284. The school district permitted the drop-off practice
at the request of some parents who wanted their children to arrive home earlier; it
required the children to walk along a heavily-traveled road. Id. at 665, 482 S.E.2d at 284.
256. 220 Ga. App. 510, 469 S.E.2d 529 (1996). The supreme court said that the court
of appeals "found that the boy's use of the school bus had not ended at the time he was
struck even if the school bus was miles away because the boy had not reached a 'place of
safety.'" 267 Ga. at 668, 482 S.E.2d at 286.
257. 267 Ga. at 668, 482 S.E.2d at 286. Accordingly, the policy applied and thus
waived the district's immunity. I& at 667, 482 S.E.2d at 285. Justice Fletcher dissented
without opinion.
258. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1996).
259. 223 Ga. App. 392, 477 S.E.2d 642 (1996).
260. Id. at 392, 477 S.E.2d at 642. The driver was an employee of a transmission shop
at which the truck had been repaired. I.
261. Id at 394, 477 S.E.2d at 644. "Therefore, the driver of the vehicle would not be
an insured under the terms and conditions of [the county's] policy of insurance, and [the
county] would not have insurance coverage for this incident." Id.
262. I& "Thus, since OCGA [section] 33-24-51(b) waives sovereign immunity only to
the extent that (the county] has insurance, sovereign immunity has not been waived by
[the county] for any claim due to negligence of the driver of the truck under the theories
of vicarious liability, imputed liability from ownership, or respondeat superior." Id. The
court further rejected plaintiffs argument that the county's prior modification of the truck,
combined with the negligence of the mechanic, operated to waive immunity. Id.
The court reached a similar conclusion in Saylor v. Troup County, 225 Ga. App. 489,484
S.E.2d 298 (1997), involving a county prison inmate injured while sharpening a swingblade
on a vise attached to the bumper of an insured county van. I& at 489, 484 S.E.2d at 299.
Holding no waiver of county immunity to operate, the court observed that "the van itself
was only remotely related to the accident," and that plaintiffs "injury did not 'originate in'
or 'flow from' the use of the van as a motor vehicle." Id. at 490, 484 S.E.2d at 299.
263. 222 Ga. App. 177, 474 S.E.2d 89 (1996).
264. Id at 177, 474 S.E.2d at 89. Plaintiff was assigned to a tree trimming detail in
the county and fell from the county backhoe operated by a county employee. Id.
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liability policy,'e the court eschewed a "strict interpretation" of the
Rather, the court reasoned,
statute's reference to "motor vehicle.'
"[gleneral liability policies are purchased primarily to provide coverage
for incidents other than those covered under automobile liability poliAccordingly, the statute permitted the insurance waiver for
cies.'
the backhoe, even though it was not a vehicle "designed for and used
primarily on public streets."26
Other efforts at avoiding immunity sounded in nuisance, inverse
condemnation, and constitutional tort. The nuisance venture drew short
shrift from the court of appeals in Kordares v. Gwinnett County,' a
wrongful death action for a collapsing bridge.270 A county is liable in
nuisance only in the context of inverse condemnation, the court
reasoned, not for claims in personal injury or wrongful death. 7
Butler v. Gwinnett County27 2 featured plaintiffs' effort, some two
years following condemnation of portions of their property, to claim
Although
inverse condemnation of their remaining property.273
recovery
for
award
does
not
preclude
conceding that a condemnation
later negligent or improper construction on the condemned property, the
court deemed plaintiffs' claims insufficient. 4 Rather, the "claimed
damages flow naturally and proximately from the County's decision to

265. Id. at 179, 474 S.E2d at 92. "The county's waiver of sovereign immunity by the
purchase of general liability insurance coverage for the type of incident here involved is
clearly authorized under OCGA [section] 33-24-51(a)." Id.
266. Id., 474 S.E.2d at 91-92. "Where, as here, the subject vehicle would not fit the
definition of motor vehicle under the automobile liability statutes, as it was not designed
for and used primarily on public streets, coverage may be available under the general
liability policy .... " Id.
267. Id., 474 S.E.2d at 92. Indeed, the court noted, the general liability policy in issue
"specifically provides coverage applicable to the present case, for the use of mobile
equipment." Id.
268. Id., 474 S.E.2d at 91. The court thus reversed the trial judge's grant of summary
judgment for the county. Id. at 180, 474 S.E.2d at 92.
269. 220 Ga. App. 848, 470 S.E.2d 479 (1996).
270. Id. at 848, 470 S.E.2d at 479-80.
271. I&, 470 S.E.2d at 479. The court affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary
judgment for the county. Id. at 852, 470 S.E.2d at 482. For perspective on both municipal
and county nuisances, and the historic distinction between them, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Municipal Liability in Georgia: The "Nuisance'Nuisance, 12 GA. ST. B.J. 11 (1975); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REv. 1
(1991).
272. 223 Ga. App. 703, 479 S.E.2d 11 (1996).
273. Id. at 703, 479 S.E.2d at 12.
274. Id. at 704, 479 S.E.2d at 13. Plaintiffs "point to no authority equating such design
complaints with the type of negligent construction authorizing an additional award of
damages after a condemnation proceeding." Id.

246

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

condemn this property and devote it to building and operating a highway
access lane."275 Those damages were recoverable in the original
eminent domain proceedings, the court held, and did not constitute
inverse condemnation."
The constitutional tort claim surfaced in Washington v. Jefferson
County,277 a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for the death of plaintiff's son
killed by a county arrestee out on bail. 27' Absent a special relationship, the court concluded, the county had no duty "to protect [plaintiff's
son] any more than any other member of the general public. 22
Absent the duty, plaintiff "failed to show a nexus between [her son's]
injury and any state action."m
The liability litigated in Cherokee County v. North Cobb Surgical
Associates" concerned charges for medical services rendered by
plaintiffs to a suspect shot by a deputy sheriff. 2 Viewing county
responsibility for those charges to turn upon whether the suspect was an
"inmate" in the county's "physical custody," the court reviewed the
evidence. 2' Finding sufficient "custody," the court emphasized that
one deputy shot the suspect, another placed him in restraints, and a
county vehicle transported him to the hospital.m As for "inmate"

275. Id. at 705, 479 S.E.2d at 13. This was true whether or not plaintiffs had
anticipated these consequential damages at the time of the original condemnation. Id.
276. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the
county. Id.
277. 221 Ga. App. 81, 470 S.E.2d 714 (1996).
278. Id. at 82-83, 470 S.E.2d at 716. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which
"imposes liability where persons acting under color of state law have deprived a person of
a federal constitutional or statutory right." Id. See R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAWS ASSIMILATION OF Monell: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW
"PERSONS," (1984); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government and Constitutional Torts: In
the Georgia Courts, 49 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1997).
279. 221 Ga. App. at 83, 470 S.E.2d at 716. The court emphasized that plaintiff's son
was not in custody and did not face any special danger of assault by the arrestee as
distinguished from the danger to the general public. Id.
280. Id. at 82, 470 S.E.2d at 716. The court affirmed the trial judge's summary
judgment for the county on plaintiff's Section 1983 claim. Id. at 83, 470 S.E.2d at 716.
281. 221 Ga. App. 496, 471 S.E.2d 561 (1996).
282. Id. at 496-97, 471 S.E.2d at 561-62. County deputies had responded to a request
for assistance from municipal police and found the suspect holding a large knife and acting
erratically. When the suspect charged one of the deputies, he was shot, given first aid, and
transported to a hospital. Id.
283. Id. at 499, 471 S.E.2d at 564 (citing O.C.GA § 42-5-2(a) (1997)). "Although this
Code section is included in the chapter of Title 42 that concerns correctional institutions,
it nevertheless indicates that it is the intent of the legislature that governmental entities
should pay for the medical expenses incurred by inmates who are in their physical
custody." Id.
284. Id. at 497-98, 471 S.E.2d at 563.
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status, the court reasoned that but for his injury, the suspect would have
been placed in county detention. That circumstance constituted the
suspect an inmate, "even though he was not actually detained in the
detention facility."28 5 These conclusions led the court to sustain the
trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the medical provider.'28
Claimants frequently sought recovery from individual county officers
and employees themselves, prompting defendants' countering assertions
Deriving from the 1991 constitutional
of "official immunity."287
amendment,2s official immunity turns upon whether the offending
conduct is deemed "ministerial" (liability for negligence) 29 or "discretionary" (liability only for willfullness) .2 ' During the survey period,
the court of appeals designated as "discretionary" (hence immunity)
several alleged offenses on the part of county school personnel. This was
the result in Hemak v. Houston County School District"l for failures
by a school principal and teacher to check repairs to a drainage
grate;292 in Kelly v. Lewis's for failures by a principal and teacher
to properly supervise and secure students; 294 and in Perkins v. Morgan

285. Id. at 499-500, 471 S.E.2d at 564.
286. Id. at 500, 471 S.E.2d at 564.
287. "Sovereign" or "governmental" immunity protects the local government's public
purse, and "official" immunity protects officials and employees sued in their individual
capacities so that responsible people will fill public positions. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Adams,
211 Ga. App. 156, 438 S.E.2d 659 (1993). For treatment of the topic, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Officers: Rights for their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., IndividualLiability in GeorgiaLocal Government Law: The Haunting
Hiatus ofHennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government
Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
288. GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX(d). The leading decision on the point remains,
however, Hennessy u. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980).
289. An act that is "simple, absolute, definite," and "requiring merely the execution of
a specific duty." See, e.g., Joyce v. Van Arsdale, 196 Ga. App. 95, 395 S.E.2d 275 (1990).
290. An act calling for the exercise of "personal deliberation and judgment" and
manifested in actions "not specifically directed." Id. at 96, 395 S.E.2d at 276 (citations
omitted).
291. 220 Ga. App. 110, 469 S.E.2d 679 (1996).
292. Id. at 110-11, 469 S.E.2d at 679-80. Plaintiff fell into the defective grate while
attending a school concert; the grate had previously been repaired but later failed again;
and plaintiff charged defendants with negligently failing to inspect. Id. The court
concluded that the "follow-up or review of repairs made by a maintenance department,
involving as it does the evaluation of the quality of those repairs, is the essence of a
discretionary function." Id. at 113, 469 S.E.2d at 682. The court thus deemed official
immunity to apply. Id.
293. 221 Ga. App. 506, 471 S.E.2d 583 (1996).
294. Id. at 506, 471 S.E.2d at 583-85. Plaintiffs decedent was shot by a gang on the
way to school and plaintiff charged defendants with failing to provide adequate supervision
and security for arriving students. Id. The court rejected plaintiffs effort to distinguish
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County School District' for improper early dismissals of students by
members of a school board, superintendent, and secretary'
The court employed the same exercise in reviewing charges against
county law enforcement personnel. In Morgan v. Barnes,' the court
rejected an action against a deputy sheriff who collided with plaintiff
The pursuit decision, the
while pursuing a suspected stolen car.'
court held, "called for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment
Although arriving at the same
and was therefore discretionary.'
classification in Johnson u. Gonzalez," the court reserved judgment
on a further issue."0 ' There, an officer responded to an "urgent" call,
passed plaintiff's car on the left, and struck the car as plaintiff
attempted to make a left turn.N2 Declaring the officer's response a
"discretionary" act,' the court nevertheless insisted that a jury
consider the issue of the officer's "reckless disregard.' °

between negligent acts and negligent failure to act: "[Tihe complete failure to perform a
discretionary act is the same as the negligent performance of that act for the purposes of
determining whether such action was discretionary or ministerial." Id. at 509, 471 S.E.2d
at 587. The court affirmed the trial judge's decision that official immunity applied. Id.
295. 222 Ga. App. 831, 476 S.E.2d 592 (1996).
296. Id. at 831-32, 476 S.E.2d at 592-93. Plaintiffs decedent was shot by a third party
after being released from school early, and plaintiff charged the school board members and
the school superintendent with negligence in adopting early dismissal rules, and the school
secretary with negligence in administering those rules. Id at 831, 476 S.E.2d at 592. The
court held that the decision to adopt or not adopt such rules was completely discretionary,
and that the secretary's actions in following those rules involved discretion. Id. at 834, 476
S.E.2d at 595. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision that official immunity
applied. Id. at 837, 476 S.E.2d at 597.
297. 221 Ga. App. 653, 472 S.E.2d 480 (1996).
298. Id. at 655, 472 S.E.2d at 481.
299. Id. He made the decision "in the early morning hours when traffic was minimal,
... in response to reports that [the car] had eluded police and under a reasonable
perception that it could be stolen." Id. There was no evidence of malice or intent, and the
court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision that official immunity applied. Id. at 654-55,
422 S.E.2d at 481.
300. 223 Ga. App. 646, 478 S.E.2d 410 (1996).
301. Id. at 646, 478 S.E.2d at 410.
302. Id., 478 S.E.2d at 411.
303. Id. at 647, 478 S.E.2d at 412. "Because the call removed [the officer] from his
routine patrol, his acts in response to the call were discretionary." Id.
304. Id. at 648, 478 S.E.2d at 412.
At some point, as here, the acts of an officer preclude an assessment of the nature
of his conduct by a court as a matter of law. A jury must decide whether [the
officer's] decision to overtake [plaintiffs] vehicle, without activating his emergency
lights or siren, was merely negligent or whether it constituted a reckless disregard
for the safety of others.
I& (emphasis added).
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Strickland u. Vaughn' arose from plaintiff's being struck by an
habitual violator' whose impounded car the defendant sheriff had
released to the violator's friend.'
Emphasizing that the car undeniably belonged to the violator, the court could not conceive that the sheriff
"had a duty to retain indefinitely the property of another without
statutory authority to do so.' ° That "position," the court asserted, "is
without support in Georgia law."s "
Plaintiff's cause likewise foundered in Booth v. Firemen's Insurance
Co.," a complaint that a sheriff violated his official bond by referring
to plaintiff with racial slurs. 11 The court observed that the sheriff's
conversation was with another officer, that the sheriff had no official
business with plaintiff, and exercised no authority toward him.
Consequently, the slurs were not "the type of 'official act' performed
under color of office that would permit recovery on [the sheriff's]
bond. 315
Finally, the arresting deputy sheriff in Gardner v. Rogers 13 unsuccessfully claimed qualified immunity to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for
excessive force.3"4 Reviewing evidence of plaintiff's cooperation with

305. 221 Ga. App. 636, 472 S.E.2d 159 (1996).
306. Id. at 636, 472 S.E.2d at 160. Plaintiff sought to hold the sheriff responsible for
the violator's reclaiming his car upon being released from jail and, some twenty-seven days
later, colliding with plaintiffs car resulting in the death of plaintiffs small child. Id.
307. Id. The sheriff had released the car to a city police officer who agreed to hold it
for the violator while in jail and who then permitted the released violator to reclaim the
car. Id.
308. Id. at 639, 472 S.E.2d at 162. The court noted that O.C.GJ.A section 40-6-391.2
was not in effect at the time of these events. Id.
309. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the sheriff. 1&, 472 S.E.2d at 163.
310. 223 Ga. App. 243, 477 S.E.2d 376 (1996).
311. I& at 244, 477 S.E.2d at 377. Plaintiff became involved in a traffic altercation
with another driver, was interviewed by another officer, that officer then conversed with
the offending deputy who-during the conversation-referred to the plaintiff in racially
offensive language. Id.
312. Id. at 246, 477 S.E.2d at 379. Affirming the trial judge's grant of summary
judgment for defendant, the court asserted that "a suit on a deputy's bond is an action in
contract for the tortious acts of the deputy in the performance of his official duties.., and
recovery is available only for those acts of the deputy that are performed by virtue of or
under color of his office." Id., 477 S.E.2d at 378. For treatment of the official bond liability
of Georgia local government officers, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government
Officers: Rights for their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979).
313. 224 Ga. App. 165, 480 S.E.2d 217 (1996).
314. Id. at 167, 480 S.E.2d at 220. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Plaintiff also sued the
county sheriff for having a policy that condoned violation of plaintiffs civil rights. 224 Ga.
App. at 166, 480 S.E.2d at 219.
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defendant's investigation," 6 the court viewed it "apparent to any
reasonable officer in [defendant's] position that force was not authorized
and that [defendant's] use of force against plaintiff was excessive and
illegal."3 1 ' Defendant's plea of qualified immunity thus failed the
requisite test of "objective reasonableness," 17 and the court reversed
summary judgment for the deputy.""
F

Zoning
The genesis issue of local government zoning involves its basic
applicability to the proposed land use. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Commission v. Bibb County School District"9 presented that
issue. There, the school district proposed a football stadium at a location
where stadiums were prohibited by county zoning regulations."0 The
court of appeals, treating the matter to summary disposition, 2' simply
affirmed the trial judge's decision that governmental entities possess
immunity from local zoning regulations. 3'
The issue in DeKalb County v. Dobson' 2 proved far more troublesome. There, the county sought reversal of the trial judge's decision that
an existing zoning classification was unconstitutional as applied to two

315. 224 Ga. App. at 168, 480 S.E.2d at 220. Evidence indicated that plaintiff
responded to all defendant's questions, and inquired as to whether she was under arrest
before attempting to close the door to defendant. Id
316. Id.
317. Id. at 167, 480 S.E.2d at 220. "While it is true that police officers performing
discretionary functions are generally entitled to qualified immunity shielding them from
personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such immunity exists only Insofar as [the
officer's] conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.'" Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 801 (1982))
318. I& at 169, 480 S.E.2d at 221. The court affirmed summary judgment for the
sheriff, finding no evidence of "a direct order from him" or that the arrest was effected "in
accordance with an intentional custom or policy instituted by [him]." Id.
319. 222 Ga. App. 264, 474 S.E.2d 70 (1996).
320. Id. at 264, 474 S.E.2d at 70-71. The zoning commission had denied the school
district's application for a conditional use permit for construction of the stadium on grounds
that the plans did not provide the minimum number of off-street parking spaces required
by zoning regulations. The school district then sought injunctive relief, claiming exemption
from the zoning regulations. Id.
321. Id. at 264-65, 474 S.E.2d at 71-72. The court noted the available "tests" for
determining zoning immunities, as well as the supreme court's past rejections of those
tests. Id. For treatment of the issue, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Exposure
to Local Government Zoning, 25 GA. ST. B.J. 180 (1989).
322. 222 Ga. App. at 266, 474 S.E.2d at 72. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
grant of the school district's requests for relief.
323. 267 Ga. 624, 482 S.E.2d 239 (1997).
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adjacent parcels of land." A bare majority of the supreme court, upon
its review of the evidence, deemed the trial court's decision "clearly
That decision, the court determined, rested upon
erroneous."3 25
evidence that rezoning would insure greater profits to the landowners
and would facilitate the property's development. 26 Neither of those
points sufficiently showed "by clear and convincing evidence" that the
27
existing zoning burdened the owners with "a significant detriment.
Far more localized in scope, Bo Fancy Productions, Inc. v. Rabun

County Board of Commissioners"~ compared a specific zoning ordinance and a particular land use.329 Initially, the court held that an

"agricultural" zone permitted a proposed three-day commercial entertain-

324. Id. at 624-25, 482 S.E.2d at 240-41. The landowners sought to have their land
rezoned from a more restrictive to a less restrictive "residential" classification, and the
county rejected their efforts. The landowners then appealed to the superior court,
contending that the more restrictive classification was unconstitutional as applied to their
properties. Id. For background on the litigation-prone posture oflocal government zoning
during the past thirty years (it has constituted the second most litigated issue in Georgia
local government law), and a brief description of the contending issues, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Law: A Reflection on Thirty Surveys, 46 MERCER
L. REV. 1, 16-19 (1994).
325. 267 Ga. at 626, 482 S.E.2d at 241. The court agreed that zoning ordinances are
.presumptively valid," that the standard of review is the "clearly erroneous" test, and that
the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the landowner's showing "by
clear and convincing evidence that the zoning classification is a significant detriment to
him, and is insubstantially related to the public health, safety, morality, and welfare." Id.
326. Id., 482 S.E.2d at 242. The court asserted that a landowner cannot satisfy his
burden by showing that the land could be put to a more profitable use if rezoned; rather,
"in cases such as this one, the only relevant evidence regarding the value of the subject
property is its value as it currently is zoned." Id.
327. Id. at 627, 482 S.E.2d at 242. Reversing the trial judge, the court said "there was
no evidence before the trial court that would justify its ruling that the R-85 zoning
classification was unconstitutional as applied." Id. In a dissenting opinion for himself and
two other justices, Justice Carley contended that the majority's approach was internally
inconsistent:
Rather than properly affirming the judgment on the basis that the trial court's
findings are not clearly erroneous, the majority, while purporting to apply the
correct standard of review and not to deviate from or expand on precedent, does
indeed deviate from this court's precedent by incorrectly reweighing the facts for
itself in order to support its conclusion that the Landowners failed to present clear
and convincing evidence of invalidity.
Id. at 630, 482 S.E.2d at 244 (Carley, J., dissenting).
328. 267 Ga. 341, 478 S.E.2d 373 (1996).
329. Id. at 341-42, 478 S.E.2d at 373-74. The county sought to enjoin the holding of a
commercial entertainment event, alleging that the event would violate the county zoning
ordinance covering the land where the event was to be held. The event itself was to be
held on land zoned "agricultural," and parking for the event was to be located on adjoining
land zoned "residential." Id.
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ment event." Contrarily, the court delineated, land zoned "residential" could not serve as a parking lot for vehicles of those attending the
event.3 3' The court derived its conclusions from the fact that the
"zoning ordinance specifically provides that those uses authorized for
property zoned 'residential' shall not be employed for 'commercial
purposes,' but does not specifically prohibit those uses authorized for
property zoned 'agricultural' from being so employed." 2
III. LEGISLATION
Space limitations confine treatment of legislation to mere mention of
a few major measures enacted by the 1997 General Assembly.
No enactment carries greater long-term implications for local
governments than the statute providing for a "Service Delivery

Strategy." "

Intended to address service duplications and land use

conflicts between local governments, the extensive enactment requires

county-municipal agreement upon a service delivery plan by 1999. 3"

The plan will designate the government to provide specified services,
mesh local government land use plans, and minimize county-city

330. Id. at 343, 478 S.E.2d at 375. "It follows that the trial court erred in concluding
that the rally could not be held on 'agricultural' property simply because it was a
'commercial' endeavor." I&
331. Id. at 344, 478 S.E.2d at 375. "It follows that operating on 'residential' property
a parking lot for the vehicles of those attending the commercial rally on the adjoining
'agricultural' property would violate the ordinance and the trial court was correct in so
holding." Id.
332. Id. at 342, 478 S.E.2d at 374. Said the court: "Had the intent been to prohibit the
employment for 'commercial purposes' of the uses authorized for property zoned
'agricultural,' as well as for property zoned 'residential,' the ordinance presumably would
have so provided." Id.
An additional issue in the case, not specifically local-government in nature, went to the
constitutionality of Georgia's Mass Gatherings Act (O.C.G.A. §§ 31-27-1 to -12 (1996)).
Because the Act required that a permit be obtained from the State Department of Human
Resources, but did not specify when, or even if, the Department must act upon the
application, the supreme court held the statute constitutionally impermissible. Id at 345,
478 S.E.2d at 376. "'A scheme that fails to set reasonable time limits on the decisionmaker
creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech.'" Id. (quoting FW/PBS, Inc.
v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 226 (1990)).
333. Ga. H.R. Bill 489, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-70-1 to -5, -20 to 28).
334. Id. All local governments within a county must participate in developing the plan;
it must then be approved by each city with a population of more than nine thousand, by
each city serving as a county seat, and by at least fifty percent of the remaining
municipalities with at least five hundred persons. The plan must be completed by July 1,
1999. Id.

19971

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

253

Cities will be
disputes resulting from municipal annexations.an
limited in providing extraterritorial services and in charging higher
7 counties must eliminate
water-sewer rates in unincorporated areas;W3
8"
Compliance incentives prohibit state financial
double taxation.
assistance to local governments without an agreement in place by
1999.M
Likewise aspiring to uniformity, a newly enacted statute requires the
Department of Community Affairs to prepare, and local governments to
Concurrently, the measure
use, "uniform charts of accounts."-k
requires, the Department must publish an annual "community indicators
local governments making annual expenditures of
report" for
a41
$250,000.
A major measure aimed at economic revitalization empowers
municipalities and counties to create "enterprise zones" in which the
government may offer property tax exemptions and abatements to
qualified businesses, as well as reductions of occupational taxes and
regulatory fees.8 42 Yet another economically-driven statute confirms
the authority of local governments to participate in federal and state
" The government may also be held liable
programs of job training.&
for local grantees who misspend program funds.3"
Among general government authorizations, counties may now store
court records anywhere within the state, and other county documents
within one hundred miles of the courthouse, in data storage and

335. Id. The county must file the finished plan with the Georgia Department of
Community Affairs, and it must be reviewed and revised over time. Id.
336. Id. Provision of such services must be agreed upon and consistent with the
county's zoning ordinances. Id.
337. Id. Counties are provided standing for challenging the reasonableness of
municipal unincorporated water rates. Id.
338. Id. Counties must finance their services to unincorporated residents primarily
from revenues derived from unincorporated residents and property. Id,
339. Id. Both the local government and the proposed program must be included in the
plan in order to receive state financial assistance on or after July 1, 1999. kd
340. Ga. H.R. Bill 491, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-81-1, -3, -8). The
charts of accounts must be adopted by December 31, 1998. Id.
341. I& The report will treat the local government's services and administration. Id
342. Ga. H.R. Bill 663, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 36-88-1, to -10). The
statute provides a table of ad valorem tax exceptions, and specifies that the exemptions
of the local government's tax digest. The life span
may not exceed ten percent of the value
at ten years. Id.
of an enterprise zone is capped
343. Ga. S. Bill 101, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.GA. § 36-87-2). The programs
include job research assistance and workforce development programs. Id
344. Id
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retrieval facilities.' s Counties must pay retrieval costs for the records
and may specify by contract retrieval times for delivery'
Of newly enacted regulatory measures, some are permissive and some
are mandatory. Illustrative of the former, local governments are
authorized to restrict the location of "explicit media outlets" to commercial or industrial areas, and no such outlet or adult movie theater can be
located within one thousand feet of schools, places of worship, or
residential areas."' Illustrative of the mandatory, local governments
are prohibited from authorizing the location of new package liquor
retailers within five hundred yards of existing retailers.'
In an assortment of measures, the legislature imposed various
limitations or restrictions upon local governments. As for municipalities,
they may not locate solid waste disposal facilities within one-half mile
of the city-county boundary without approval from the county." 9 A
municipality desiring to annex land must establish a process for
35
resolving land use classification disputes with an objecting county. 0
Additionally, the General Assembly expressly secured its own power to
annex or de-annex by local statutes."i That power, the new measure
mandates, is unimpaired by alternative methods of municipal annexation or de-annexation. 5 2 As for counties, they are required to consult
with their municipalities on municipal projects for inclusion on ballots
for special local option sales tax referenda."
Several newly enacted statutes dealt with matters peculiar to
legislative interests of local governments. Seeking to encourage county
codification, one measure provides that fees collected to support county
law libraries may be used to pay the costs of establishing or maintaining
a program for the codification of county ordinances.'" As for state

345. Ga. S. Bill 324, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 15-1-10, 15-6-86,36-9-5).
346. Id. Records must be retrieved within a reasonable time. Id.
347. Ga. S. Bill 62, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-60-3). The statute also
revises definitions of nudity and sexual conduct. Id.
348. Ga. H.R. Bill 500, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-49).
349. Ga. H.R. Bill 219, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 12-8-25, -59.2).
350. Ga. H.R. Bill 489, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 30-70-24(4X0)). The
process must be established by July 1, 1998. Id.
351. Ga. H.R. Bill 217, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.GA. § 36-36-10).
352. Id.
353. Ga. H.R. Bill 490, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 48-8-3, -111). The
statute does not mandate counties to include municipal projects in the call for the sales tax.
I&.
354. Ga. H.R. Bill 54, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-15-1, -7, -9, 36-3210.2). These fees are collected on cases filed in courts of record. The county governing
authority, with the consent of the chairperson of the board of law library trustees, makes
the request for application of the fees to the program of codification. Id. For treatment of
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enactments, population statutes attracted additional restrictions.
Population statutes may not be used to set salaries of local government
officers and employees nor to affect the property, affairs, or operation of
a local governing authority (including municipal annexation, deannexation, incorporation, or dissolution)."
Local statutes likewise
received additional attention. A new enactment specifies the types of
local statutes the effective dates of which are delayed until January 1 of
the year following enactment."M Further, the enactment limits the
types of local legislation which must be directly noticed to the affected
5 7 These include local bills amending city charters or
city or county."
county enabling
acts; excepted, however, are local bills requested by the
35
county or city. s
IV.

CONCLUSION

If "remarkable" sets the standard, then local government law
assuredly claims status as the standard bearer. Its challenge for the
future will focus upon obtaining safe passage, free from the snares of
analytical trolls, across the heralded "bridge to the twenty-first century."
Whether propelled by the toss of the coin or otherwise, that should prove
remarkable too.

local government codification, including the distinction between municipal and county
employment of the practice, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND THE
PRACTICE OF GEORGIA LOCAL GOVNERMENT LAW 33-37 (1994).
355. Ga. H.R. Bill 98, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.GA § 28-1-15). The statute
expressly excepts statewide minimum salary bills even though based on population. The

statute further provides that existing population statutes can be amended only to maintain
their applicability to the governments for which they were originally intended, as the
populations of those localities may change. Id.
356. Ga. H.R. Bill 188, Reg. Sess. (1997) (codified at O.C.GA §§ 1-3-4.1, 28-1-14).
Included are bills requiring the local government to create new personnel positions;
requiring increases in salaries, benefits, or compensation; and requiring capital

expenditures. Id.
357. Id. The statute also expands the time for providing the required notice. Id
358. Id.

